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The state and its policies are major sources of uncertainty for firms. They control 
the opportunities and threats faced by firms and shape their competitive environments.  
Firms proactively adopt political strategies to influence public policies and create 
favorable external environment. A prevalent political strategy adopted by firms in 
emerging economies is to cultivate personal relationships with political actors. Despite of 
the recognized importance of political ties to firms, we know relatively little about when 
and how they function to shape firm behavior and outcomes. To address these important 
issues, this dissertation investigates how political ties maintained by business groups in 
emerging economies affect their entries into new industries. The empirical analysis of 
this dissertation is based on extensive longitudinal data of the large business groups in 
Taiwan over an 18-year period from 1986-2004.   
Based on a theoretical analysis of the evolutionary role of political ties in 
emerging economies, we further conduct two empirical studies in the context of Taiwan 
across three stages of its institutional transitions. In the first empirical study, we examine 
how different types of political ties (i.e. formal, family, and social ties) influence market 
entries individually and in combination by drawing on the literature of political 
embeddedness and corporate political activity. This study provides a theoretical basis for 
the predictably differential effects of different types of political ties resulting from the 
distinct nature of interplays between connected parties.  
In the second study, we examine how political ties maintained by a firm with rival 
political parties affect the firm’s entry into new industries. Drawing on the social network 
research, resource dependence theory, and corporate political strategy literature, we argue 
that the impact of a firm’s portfolio of political ties on market entry depends on the 
distribution of political power among rival political parties and the concomitant 
interdependency between the focal firm and its political partners. The findings have 
implications for research on the corporate political strategy, contingencies of social 
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As an important actor in an economy, firms do not exist in an autonomous 
condition, but rather are constrained by a network of interdependencies with other 
organizations. A major source of firms’ external interdependencies is the state and the 
government that runs it (Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Shaffer, 1995). The state 
shapes the institutional organization of the economy through the manipulation of property 
rights, and the establishment of laws and regulations (Campbell and Lindberg, 1990; 
North, 1981). The state also influences the activities of firms by allocating critical 
resources, such as capital and technology (Hall, 1986; Nee, 1989, 1991; Skocpol, 1985). 
In addition, the goods and services provided by the government, including currency, 
communication infrastructures, and justice and law enforcement services, influence the 
nature and efficiency of the economy (Caves, 1982; Ring, et al., 2005).  
Rather than treating government influence as exogenous, firms often proactively 
participate into the political process and influence government policies by taking 
advantage of the government’s dependence on them in providing substantial employment 
and taxes, as well as affecting the outcomes of political elections through campaign 
contributions, advocacy advertising, and voting (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Keim and 
Zeithaml, 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The interdependencies between the state and 
firms serve as a basis for the business-government interactions. As the government 
expands its scope and the political process becomes more dynamic, more and more firms 
are engaged in political activities to influence the public policy process so as to mitigate 
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uncertainty (Baysinger, Keim and Zeithaml, 1985; Hillman, Zardkoohi and Bierman, 
1999).  
Prior research on corporate political activities mainly focuses on the political 
strategies of firms in developed economies. It has been found that firms employ a variety 
of tactics, such as lobbying, campaign contributions, constituency construction and 
advocacy advertising, to create a favorable policy environment (Lord, 2000; Masters and 
Keim, 1985; Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002). A burgeoning literature around the 
business-government interplay in emerging economies, however, indicates that unlike 
those in developed economies, firms in emerging economies mainly interact with the 
state through interpersonal linkages between business executives and political actors 
(Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006)1. These political ties bear implications for the survival and profitability of firms to 
the extent that they shape firms’ access to information, resources and preferential 
treatments (e.g. Backman, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006), and affect their legitimacy (e.g. Peng, 2003; Siegel, 2007).  
The ways of business-government interplay differ in developed and emerging 
economies primarily due to the substantial variations in their economic and political 
institutional arrangements. Compared to developed economies, emerging economies are 
characterized by institutional voids in economic and legal systems (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997). The underdeveloped market infrastructures and weak enforcement of contracts 
makes transaction costs in emerging economies extremely high. Consequently, firms 
resort to political ties to acquire desirable information and resources with much lower 
                                                 
1 A few recent studies conducted in the context of developed economies have found that political connections are 
among the various means of firms to interact with the state (e.g. Bertrand, et al., 2004; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 
2006; Hillman, 2005; Hillman, Zardkoohi and Bierman, 1999).  
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levels of uncertainty and opportunism because such ties provide informal institutions, 
such as trust, reciprocity, and obligations, as substitutes to the underdeveloped formal 
institutions (Nee and Su, 1996; Xin and Pearce, 1996). Moreover, rather than acting as an 
invisible hand which provides basic institutional arrangements and leaves most allocative 
decisions to the private sectors, the governments of emerging economies are involved 
intimately in economic decisions (e.g. governments in China, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan), and may even serve as a grabbing hand when bureaucrats pursue their own 
agendas (e.g. governments in Russia), including taking bribes (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Despite of the political democratization and economic 
liberalization in most emerging economies, state actors often control substantial resources 
and retain many levers for steering these resources to politically connected firms (He, 
1998; Ledeneva, 1998; Yang, 2002). Given the unique nature of the state and business-
government interactions in emerging economies, additional studies that investigate the 
mechanisms by which firms’ linkages to the government affect their strategy and 
performance, and the extent to which analysis of corporate political activities grounded in 
developed economies can be generalized to emerging economies would represent 
valuable contributions to strategic management research and practice.  
This dissertation aspires to make such contributions by investigating when and 
how various types of political ties between business executives and political actors affect 
the market entries by connected firms in emerging economies. It seeks to fill three major 
theoretical gaps in the existing literature about corporate political strategy. First, 
scholarly research has well documented the differences between politically connected and 
non-connected firms in their profitability (Fisman, 2001), chance of survival (Faccio, 
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Masulis, and McConnell, 2006), and access to scare resources (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), and found that ties to the 
government matter for firms in emerging economies. However, by focusing either on the 
aggregated number of ties2 or on a specific type of tie3 maintained by firms, this literature 
has neglected the heterogeneity in political ties and their impacts on firms. As social 
network literature suggests that distinct interpersonal relationships involve different rules 
of interactions between individuals and thus lead to different network outcomes (Podolny 
and Baron, 1997; Gulati and Westphal, 1999), we distinguish types of political ties based 
on the relationships between the connected executives and political actors. We argue that 
due to their distinct properties, different types of political ties make a firm embedded in 
its political environment to differential depth and breadth, and thus exposed to various 
benefits and constraints. A firm with diverse political ties may be advantageous when 
combinations of these ties enhance benefits and/or reduce costs derived from its interplay 
with the government.  
Furthermore, the seminal studies by Fisman (2001) and Siegel (2007) show that 
the value of political ties is contingent on the status of connected political actors, and 
political ties can be turned from political capital into political liability overnight as a 
result of unexpected change in political regime. Yet, we know little so far about how 
firms should manage their political networks by getting connected to the right person at 
the right time. To address this important issue, we investigate how the rivalry between 
political parties, which determines the prominence of connected political actors and 
                                                 
2 For example, Faccio and her colleagues (2006), which examines whether managers’ political networking through 
formal position interlocks, relatives, and close friendships affect the availability of government bailouts to the 
politically connected firms.  
3 Johnson and Mitton (2003) focus on how businessmen take advantage of their friendships with political leaders to 
acquire economic rents, while Okhmatovskiy (2009) considers the performance implications of political ties in the form 
of board and ownership relations.  
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relative bargaining power of business executives in the relationships, affect the behavior 
and outcome of politically connected firms. By focusing on a firm’s portfolio of political 
ties rather than individual political ties, we depict how the focal firm targets its political 
tactics at political parties and capture the interdependencies between political ties. We 
also explore the configuration of optimal portfolios of political ties that facilitate the 
achievement of desirable goals by firms.  
In addition, prior studies about political ties mainly focus on their performance 
implications, and relatively less attention is directed to the underlying mechanisms 
through which political ties shape the sets of opportunities and threats faced by firms, and 
hence influence their performance. To open this black box, we focus on the implications 
of political ties for a firm’s diversification strategy such as entries into unrelated 
industries. As market entry involves a variety of opportunities and risks, it provides an 
ideal situation in which we are able to explore when and how political ties take effect. 
Moreover, to the extent that entry activities bear important performance implications 
through altering the allocation of available resources among business lines (Chang, 1996; 
Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991), the investigation of the political tie-entry relationship 
may also advance our understanding on how political ties affect firm performance 
through shaping their strategies.   
The empirical analysis of this dissertation is based on extensive longitudinal data 
of the large business groups in Taiwan over an 18-year period from 1986-2004. Business 
groups, consisting of legally-independent firms under common administrative and 
financial control (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), are common in emerging economies such as 
Taiwan. Business groups in Taiwan possess a substantial fraction of productive assets 
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and greatly influence the economic development of Taiwan (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
Table 1.1 below shows the economic significance of the 100 largest business groups in 
Taiwan in terms of their contributions to national GDP and national employment over the 
period of 1973-2000.  
Table 1.1 Economic Significance of the 100 largest business groups in Taiwan 
(1973-2000) 
 
Year Group Sales        (A) 
National 











1973 134600 410200 32.81 277 5125 5.40 111 
1975 165500 586300 28.23 283 5521 5.13 106 
1977 236400 823800 28.07 300 5980 5.02 100 
1979 381900 1196200 31.93 313 6426 4.87 100 
1981 507600 764200 28.77 308 6672 4.62 100 
1983 633700 2103200 30.13 330 7070 4.67  96 
1986 840200 2925700 28.72 335 7733 4.33  97 
1988 1219300 3611500 33.76 375 8107 4.63 100 
1990 1688600 4411900 38.27 397 8283 4.79 101 
1992 1872700 5440900 34.42 436 8632 5.05 101 
1994 2707700 6454500 41.95 489 8939 5.47 115 
1996 3377100 7539600 44.79 577 9068 6.36 113 
1998 5153700 8731100 59.03 770 9289 8.29 179 
2000 8342800 9803300 85.10 898 9784 9.18 100 
 
The size of the groups has been growing steadily, but there is a clear jump after 
1990. The contribution of the 100 largest groups to the national GDP rose from 32% as of 
1973 to 85% as of 2000. Business groups have also created more jobs. The percentage of 
group employees out of total employees increased from 5.40% in 1973 to 9.18% in 2000.  
Given their ubiquity and importance in the economy of Taiwan, it is important to 
understand both the market and non-market strategies (Baron, 1995; Boddewyn, 2003) 
adopted by Taiwanese business groups.  
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We focus on the period of 1986-2004 because extensive economic liberalization 
and political democratization took place in Taiwan during this period. The findings of the 
efficacy of political ties in such circumstances may add on to the ongoing debate 
regarding whether political ties are still valuable for firms after liberalization sweeping 
most emerging economies since 1980s (Siegel, 2004).  
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we 
develop an evolutionary theory of the role of political ties in the market entry by business 
groups in emerging economies. Drawing on resource dependence theory, political science 
literature, and research on business groups, we argue that the impacts of political ties on 
the growth of business groups derive from interdependencies between the government 
and business groups. When institutional change (e.g. economic and political liberalization, 
change in political regime) alters the interdependencies and the consequent bargaining 
power between the state and business groups, the benefits and costs accrued from 
political ties change accordingly. The contingent effects of political ties bear implications 
for the motivation and pattern of market entries by business groups.  
Chapter III provides background information about the evolution of the business-
government relationship in our research setting, Taiwan, from 1949-2004. It also 
compares the differences between connected and non-connected business groups in terms 
of their resource profiles, industry distribution and entry activities, offering descriptive 
evidence of the potential correlation between political ties and market entry.   
In Chapter IV, we make in-depth analysis about the properties of three types of 
political ties (i.e. formal tie, family tie and social tie), compare their relative efficacy on 
market entry, and identify the ideal composition of political networks by exploring 
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potential complementarity and/or substitutability among various political ties. This study 
provides a theoretical basis for the predictably differential effects of different types of 
political ties and the interactive effects between them.  
In Chapter V, we examine how political ties maintained by a firm with rival 
political parties affect the firm’s entry into new industries. Drawing on the social network 
research, resource dependence theory, and corporate political strategy literature, we argue 
that the impact of a firm’s portfolio of political ties on market entry depends on the 
distribution of political power among rival political parties and the concomitant 
interdependency between the focal firm and its political partners. A diverse portfolio of 
political ties may facilitate entries when the political parties are relatively evenly matched 
in political power, but may induce adverse effects when there is substantial power 
distance between political parties. Moreover, the impact of portfolios of political ties on 
market entry is contingent on the internal resources of politically connected firms. 
In Chapter VI, we summarize the key findings of this dissertation and highlight its 
theoretical contributions and managerial implications. We also suggest several directions 










Evolution of Business Groups in Emerging Economies: The Role of Political Ties in 
Market Entries  
  
Business groups, generally defined as loose constellations of firms operating in a 
wide variety of industries and being tied together through formal and informal ties, are 
key economic players in the landscape of emerging economies (Granovetter, 1995; 
Guillén, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Although they are called in different ways, 
such as Chaebol in Korea, Keiretsu in Japan, business houses in India, and grupos 
econÓmicos in South America, business groups across emerging economies share 
commonalities in their emergence and growth. In contrast to multi-business firms in 
developed economies whose existence is attributed to the application of superior 
managerial and technological knowledge to related industries, business groups emerge as 
a response to opportunities for unrelated diversification arising from entrepreneurs’ 
ability to mobilize resources through their personal linkages to state actors (Kock and 
Guillén, 2001).  
Although the importance of group leaders’ political ties to business groups has 
been indicated in existing literature, several issues regarding the role of political ties in 
the evolution of business groups remain unclear. First of all, prior studies show that 
political ties maintained by founding group leaders greatly promoted the initial creation 
of business groups in the specific institutional environment of 1960s and 1970s 
(Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Kock and Guillén, 2001), yet we know little about 
whether and how the facilitative effects of political ties would alter as the environment 
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changes4. As political ties do not function in an institutional vacuum, the extent to which 
they are effective depends on the problems and demands created by specific institutional 
environments. It is unclear what effect economic and political liberalization sweeping 
emerging economies has on the value of political ties. Moreover, it is argued that political 
ties drive business groups to enter unrelated industries because the resources acquired 
through political ties are applicable to a wide variety of business lines (Kock and Guillén, 
2001). However, to the extent that what is transferred in political ties and how a focal 
business group utilizes what it receives from political ties are particularly responsive to 
the ever-changing institutional environment (Fisman, 2001; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; 
Siegel, 2007), the pattern of market entries stimulated by political ties may also evolve 
along with institutional changes. Furthermore, prior research mainly emphasizes the 
bright sides of political ties as to provide valuable resources and information to facilitate 
entry activities, little attention has been directed to the potential dark sides of political 
ties5, making our understanding of the role of political ties incomplete. 
We seek to advance this stream of literature by developing an evolutionary theory 
about the role of political ties in market entries of business groups in the context of 
emerging economies. Specifically, we focus on two key questions. First, how do the 
impacts of political ties on market entries change as a consequence of institutional 
changes in the external environment? Second, in pluralism political systems, as seen in 
many emerging economies nowadays, how should business groups manage their 
                                                 
4 Business group literature suggests that groups tend to rely more on the organizational capability of project execution 
than on the “contact capability” of socializing with state actors when the competition between politically connected 
groups intensifies (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Kock and Guillén, 2001). Although this argument explicates how the 
effect of political ties is contingent on the competitive environment of business groups, it does not shed light on the 
influence of the larger institutional environment (e.g. political and economic institutions) in which political ties are 
embedded.  
5 A noticeable exception is Siegel’s (2007) study about how political ties could derail the formation of strategic 
alliances between local firms and foreign firms as a result of unexpected changes in political regime in South Korea.  
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portfolios of political ties with competing political parties so as to maximize the net 
benefits extracted from their political networks?  
Building upon the insights from resource dependence theory, political science 
literature, and research on business groups, we propose that the impacts of political ties 
on the growth of business groups through market entries derive from interdependencies 
between the government and business groups. When institutional changes in the 
environment (e.g. economic liberalization and political democratization) take place and 
consequently alter the interdependencies and bargaining power between the government 
and business groups, the benefits and costs accrued from political ties change accordingly. 
The contingent effects of political ties bear implications for the motivation and pattern of 
market entries by business groups. Furthermore, we examine how a focal business group 
should manage its portfolio of political ties so as to enter target industries when 
confronting rival political parties competing for political power. We argue that in a 
pluralism political system, the impact of a portfolio of ties to political parties on market 
entries depends on the political power of connected parties, the interdependence between 
the focal business group and connected parties, and the relationships among connected 
parties.  
As a response to Khanna and Yafeh’s (2007) call to incorporate business-
government interplay into the research of business groups, our theory enriches scholarly 
understanding of the evolution of business groups. In particular, we show how the 
institutional changes sweeping emerging economies since 1980s determine the dynamics 
of interactions between business groups and the government, and thus shape the growth 
of business groups. Furthermore, we investigate how business groups manage the 
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heterogeneity of dependence on different agencies and political decision makers by 
focusing on how they adjust the configuration of portfolios of ties with rival political 
parties based on the situation of party competition and concomitant change of political 
regime. Taken together, our theoretical analysis provides supportive evidence to the 
contingency view of social network ties in the context of political networks. It suggests 
that political ties shape market entries by business groups in ways that are contingent on 
the institutional environment in which business groups are embedded in. It cautions 
business groups about the unconditional use of political ties as the institutional 
environment becomes more turbulent. 
 
INTERDEPENDENCY, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
EFFICACY OF POLITICAL TIES 
Resource dependence theory characterizes firms as constrained by a network of 
interdependencies with other organizations and regards firm behavior as actions to 
manage their external interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As one of the most 
important environmental dependencies for firms (Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999), 
the state and the government that runs it shape the opportunity sets and competitive 
environment faced by firms through formulation of laws and regulations (Campbell and 
Lindberg, 1990; North, 1981), allocation of critical resources (Hall, 1986; Nee, 1989, 
1991; Skocpol, 1985), and provision of public goods and services (Caves, 1982; Ring, et 
al., 2005). In the meantime, the government is dependent on firms for the creation of 
employment and taxes, and support for political elections in the form of votes and 
campaign contributions. The existence of interdependencies between firms and the state 
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serves as the antecedents of business-government interactions (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Determinants of the efficacy of political ties 
Political ties, based on the interpersonal relationship between top managers and 
political actors, are a widely adopted cooptation strategy by firms to reduce uncertainty 
accrued from their dependence on the government and its public policy (Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Pfeffer, 1972). Building upon the insights from research 
on alliance portfolio (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Lavie, 2007; Stuart, Hoang, 
and Hybels, 1999) and resource dependence theory, we argue that the effectiveness of a 
firm’s political ties in constructing a favorable political environment and promoting its 
achievement of desirable goals depends on three factors: (1) the prominence of the focal 
firm’s political partners, (2) the focal firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis its political 
partners, which derive from the interdependence between them, and (3) the relationships 
between the focal firm’s political partners. The first two factors determines the efficacy 
of individual dyadic political ties, whereas the third factor concerns the interdependence 
among political ties maintained by the focal firm and emphasizes the influence of a 
portfolio of political ties.  
The prominence of a political partner depends on the political power he/she 
possesses. The more political power a political actor has, the more prominent he/she is to 
the focal firm as a partner because he/she is able to steer resources and information under 
control to the focal firm and confer legitimacy to the focal firm by taking advantage of 
his/her own established legitimacy. Typical examples of prominent political partners 
include government officials, legislators, and leaders of the ruling party. In contrast, 
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political actors without political power are of least prominence to the focal firm due to 
their inability to exert significant influence on public policies and implementation. Party 
leaders of opposition parties without control over any government institutions, for 
instance, are least prominent political partners to the focal firm.  
The bargaining power of the focal firm in a political tie depends on (1) the stake it 
has in the relationship, and (2) the availability of alternative political ties or alternative 
means to achieve the same objectives (Bacharach and Lawler, 1984). The firm has 
stronger bargaining power when it has fewer stakes in the relationship and/or it has more 
alternatives than its political partner does. The stronger the firm’s bargaining power 
relative to its political partner, the more benefits the firm can extract from the political tie. 
The relationships between a focal firm’s political partners may influence the 
benefits and costs derived from the political ties as a collectivity in two ways. When 
political partners do not have interest conflicts and/or do not pursue opposing political 
ideologies, getting connected to more political actors enables the focal firm to tap on a 
large and diverse pool of resources. The synergy arising from diversity of a portfolio of 
political ties is similar to that in the context of alliance portfolio (Beckman and 
Haunschild, 2002; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Reagans and Zuckerman, 
2001). However, when political partners are competitors in political elections or embrace 
opposing political ideologies, the focal firm may suffer from connections to diverse 
political actors because powerful political partners are able to impose retaliation costs, 
which are additional costs beyond withdrawing existing benefits supplied to the focal 
firm, by utilizing their punitive power (Lawler and Bacharach, 1987). The focal firm may 
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become a victim of political struggles. Hence, the effect of a diverse portfolio of political 
ties is contingent on the relationships between network partners.  
Effects of Institutional Changes on the Role of Political Ties 
Although numerous studies have demonstrated the importance of political ties to 
firms in specific institutional environment (e.g. developed and emerging economies), 
they have largely treated the institutional environment in which political ties are 
embedded as fixed and overlooked the influence of institutional changes, which may alter 
the formal and informal “rules of the game” (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). To the extent that 
the three determinants of the efficacy of political ties are greatly influenced by 
institutional changes, we thus expect the value of political ties to vary along with the 
institutional environment.  
Most emerging economies experienced large-scale institutional transitions, 
characterized by extensive economic liberalization and political democratization, around 
late 1980s to early 1990s (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Sachs and Warner, 1995). Prior 
to the transition, totalitarian governments heavily intervened economy through regulation, 
monopolization of state-owned enterprises, and/or detailed central planning (Peng, 2003; 
Peng and Heath, 1996). Business opportunities were restricted and government officials 
normally possessed considerable control over the allocation of critical resources either 
through their power of planning or through their control of state-owned enterprises, 
including banks (Nee, 1992; McMillan, 1997). The government was normally dominated 
by a dictator or a political party with overwhelming power6. Citizens were not endowed 
with basic democratic rights, such as the right to protest, to participate in political 
                                                 
6 For instance, South Korea was under the rule of a succession of generals for decades until 1992. The Communist 
Party of Soviet Union was the only legal, ruling political party before the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991.  
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elections, and to establish new political parties. As a result, private firms, including 
business groups, were heavily dependent on the government and thus did not have much 
bargaining power in exchanges with the government through political ties.  
When economic liberalization took place, however, unprecedentedly abundant 
resources, information, and opportunities became available to firms as a result of 
deregulation and privatization (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Megginson and Netter, 2001; 
Ramamurti, 2000). The removal of capital control and the liberalization of foreign trade 
and foreign direct investment provided domestic firms with alternative sources of capital, 
market, technology, and human resources (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Luo and Chung, 
2005; Sougata, 2003). At the same time, firms were exposed to a volatile economic 
environment infused by intensified competition with both domestic and international 
rivals (Guillén, 2000).  
Accompanying economic liberalization, political democratization also proceeded. 
Democratic presidency and legislature elections substituted for the succession of 
autocrats (Huntington, 1991). The proliferation of political parties and intensified party 
competition in elections made political actors more dependent on firms for electoral 
support, such as votes and campaign contributions. The turbulent economic and political 
environment tends to reinforce the interdependence between firms and political actors, 
and thus motivates firms to manage the increased uncertainty by political efforts, such as 
cultivating political ties. Moreover, business leaders were able to enter political arena 
through participation in political elections and directly influence political decision 
making if they win elections. Their increased voice in the political process, together with 
their influence on the outcome of political elections and the availability of alternative 
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sources of supply, enhances firms’ relative bargaining power in their interactions with 
political actors. Regarding the prominence of political actors in the post-transition context, 
a few theoretical and empirical studies have shown that political actors with political 
power retain considerable control over resources and are able to steer them indirectly to 
favored firms (Chang, 2003; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng, 1994). In the process of political 
democratization, the original ruling party still dominated the political arena, leaving little 
chance to newly-established opposition parties to compete for political power. Therefore, 
party leaders of opposition parties were not comparable to counterparts of the ruling party 
in terms of their prominence to a focal firm as political partners.  
When the economic liberalization completes, the bargaining power of firms to 
political actors are likely to be reinforced as they have more alternative sources, such as 
international capital market and strategic alliances, to acquire a variety of resources, 
including capital, technologies, and human resources. At the same time, with the rapid 
growth of opposition parties, the ruling party faces increasing pressures in presidential 
and legislature elections, both of which are the major battlefields of party competition 
(Hungtington, 1968)7. There are two patterns of political power distribution as a result of 
elections. If a political party wins the majority votes in the presidency election and also 
wins the majority seats in the legislature election, it becomes the ruling party with both 
executive and legislative authority. The political power is hence concentrated in the 
hands of the ruling party members (Sundquist, 1988; Cox and Kernell, 1992). If two 
different political parties control the executive and legislative branches respectively, the 
                                                 
7 In parliamentary systems, the majority party which wins the legislative election controls both the executive and 
legislative branches. We focus on the party competition in the context of presidential systems because there is 
significant separation of political power between the executive branch and the legislative branch in presidential 
countries, which enables us to better understand the interplay between a focal firm and its rival political partners.  
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political power is relatively evenly distributed between the ruling party, which controls 
the executive branch, and the opposition party, which controls the legislative branch.  
As a result of party competition, the value of a firm’s ties to political actors is 
particularly sensitive to the change of political regime, which alters prominence of 
connected political actors dramatically (Sigel, 2007). Hence, the firm needs to adjust its 
portfolio of political ties frequently so as to get connected to the right person at the right 
time. Moreover, the focal firm is likely to enjoy stronger bargaining power when the 
political power is evenly distributed than when it is dominated by the ruling party 
because it can resort to ties to the opposition party with legislative authority as 
alternatives when it fails to acquire what is needed from ties to the ruling party. In 
addition, when political power is distributed dispersedly, the focal firm less likely to be 
punished by the powerful political parties because the intensified competition for political 
power greatly enhanced the dependence of political parties on firms for electoral support, 
and hence effectively inhibits punitive tactics taken by the ruling party and/or the 
opposition party with legislative authority.  
Taken together, compared to the previous two stages, the post-transition period 
features stronger relative bargaining power of firms in the business-government 
relationships, higher frequency of change in political regime, and the possibility of 
discrimination and retribution exerted on firms by powerful political parties, all of which 
make the interactions between the state and the business community more complicated. 
We summarize the changes in the three determinants of the efficacy of political ties 
maintained by a business group throughout three different stages of institutional 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The dramatic changes in institutional environment in which business groups are 
embedded in are likely to shape how their political ties function by making the benefits 
and costs of such ties more (less) prominent.  
 
POLITICAL TIES AND MARKET ENTRIES BY BUSINESS GROUPS 
Effects of Political Ties on the Motivations and Pattern of Market Entries 
Political ties maintained by business groups hold important implications for their 
entry activities. Based on the mechanisms by which political ties motivate market entries 
by business groups, we distinguish two types of entry activities. The first type is 
proactive entries, which are conducted proactively by business groups in order to seize 
business opportunities in the newly-entered industries. Politically connected business 
groups are advantageous than non-connected ones in the expansion of businesses due to 
their access to valuable information, resources, privileges, and legitimacy through 
political ties. They are able to obtain privileged and timely information from political 
actors to sense future direction of economic growth (Chu, 1994), to detect industrial 
policy in advance (Fields, 1997), and to identify market opportunities (Luo, 2003).  They 
may also borrow long-term loans with preferential terms from state-owned banks 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2004). In addition, these business groups may enjoy enhanced 
legitimacy conferred by highly-legitimate government agencies to which they are 
connected (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Peng, 2003; Peng and Luo, 2000). In essence, the 
extent to which political ties facilitate proactive market entries depends on the ability of a 
focal business group to mobilize the supply by connected political actors.  
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The second type of market entries is forced entries, which are undertaken by 
business groups under the pressure from connected political actors. Business groups are 
obliged to enter certain industries designated in industrial policies to show their support 
and loyalty to the government and thus promote the political career of connected political 
actors. Forced market entries can be regarded as a type of cost induced by political ties as 
the focal business group has to bear a variety of risks and costs of operating in industries 
without prior experience (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). 
A political tie is likely to induce forced entries when a focal business group is locked into 
the relationship either due to the rule of reciprocity or due to the punitive power 
possessed by the political actor.  
 We expect that politically connected groups tend to conduct more proactive 
entries and fewer forced entries as the economic and political liberalization advances. In 
the pre-transition period, business groups tend to enter relatively few industries 
proactively because of limited business opportunities in the highly regulated economy 
and their inferior ability to leverage supportive supply through political ties arising from 
their weak bargaining power relative to the government. Instead, they may be forced to 
enter certain industries by connected political actors for the sake of their own interests. 
However, upon the deregulation and privatization, business groups confront abundant 
opportunities and are motivated to enter newly opened-up sectors which are relatively 
underexploited and appear to be profitable. Moreover, taking advantage of their stronger 
bargaining position, business groups are more able to mobilize a variety of resources and 
information through political ties so as to expand their business portfolio.  After the 
completion of institutional transition, business groups are likely to undertake even more 
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proactive entries given the proliferated business opportunities in a liberalized economy 
and their superior capability of leveraging political capital by utilizing their enhanced 
bargaining power.  
In contrast, as institutional transition goes on, political actors are less likely to 
force connected groups to enter certain industries because of their weaker bargaining 
position in the interplay with business groups. Faced by the intensified political 
competition in democratic elections, political actors get more dependent on the electoral 
support provided by business groups, so they would not do anything that may deteriorate 
their relationships with business groups, such as forced market entries. Even if they 
request connected business groups to enter certain industries by taking advantage of their 
punitive power, which may happen when the political power is dominated by the ruling 
party in the post-transition period, the possibility that their requests are accepted should 
be much lower than that before and during institutional transition due to their greatly 
decreased bargaining power relative to the business groups. This leads to: 
Proposition 1: Political ties between business executives of a business group and 
political actors with political power are likely to induce more proactive market 
entries and fewer forced entries by the business group as institutional transitions 
proceed.   
Political ties are also likely to influence the pattern of market entries conducted in 
different institutional environments. Before institutional transitions take place, politically 
connected business groups tend to enter into more unrelated industries than related 
industries. Given the restrictions on entry into most industries, a business group has to 
utilize its political ties to gain permit or other privileges to overcome the entry barriers set 
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by the government. As political actors do not necessarily provide entry permits into 
product-related industries, we expect that the resulting market entries will show a highly 
diverse business portfolio. Moreover, to the extent that the industries entered upon the 
request of political actors are not likely to be related to a business group’s incumbent 
industries, the forced market entries by the group also appear a low degree of relatedness.  
With the proceeding of economic liberalization, numerous industries are 
deregulated and restrictions on private-sector banking are significantly reduced. 
Consequently, business groups rely less on the political ties to reduce or eliminate entry 
barriers set by the government and possess greater autonomy to decide which industries 
to enter. Faced by intensified market competition with both local and foreign rivals, 
business groups become more cautious in investing in industries in which they have no 
prior experience. Rather than entering into unrelated industries which involves high risk 
and costs, business groups may prefer to expand into related industries so as to benefit 
from economies of scope arising from resource sharing across related business lines 
(Teece, 1980).  Moreover, to fully utilize their organizational and technological 
capabilities developed from the exposure to various markets and foreign technologies, 
business groups are more likely to enter industries which require managerial skills and 
technological know-how similar as those used in their incumbent industries (Kock and 
Guillén, 2001). Hence, business groups tend to direct resources acquired from political 
ties to industries related to their incumbent industries. Furthermore, after institutional 
transitions, politically connected business groups tend to conduct fewer forced market 
entries, which normally features a highly diverse pattern, so their business portfolios 
should become more focused. In line with our discussion, we propose:  
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Proposition 2: Political ties between business executives of a business group and 
political actors with political power are likely to induce more entries into related 
industries and fewer entries into unrelated industries by the business as 
institutional transitions proceed.   
Effects of Portfolios of Political Ties on Market Entries 
 After the completion of institutional transitions, business groups face a highly 
turbulent political environment due to the intense party competition. To the extent that 
unexpected changes in political regime greatly influence the efficacy of political ties by 
shaping the prominence of political partners, the relative bargaining power of the focal 
business group, and the adoption of punitive tactics by powerful partners, we argue that it 
is not sufficient to consider only individual dyadic ties when examining the role of 
political ties in market entries in the post-transition period. Instead, we need to switch our 
focus to the portfolio of political ties maintained by the focal group so as to detect how 
the focal group targets its political tactics at political parties and also to accurately 
evaluate the overall influence of political ties with various political partners which are 
interdependent on each other. A diverse portfolio composed of ties with leaders of 
different political parties implies that the focal group targets multiple political parties, 
whereas a homogeneous portfolio suggests that the focal group concentrates its political 
tactics on a single or a few political parties.  
 A diverse portfolio of political ties generates both benefits and costs to the market 
entries by the focal business group. Specifically, the focal business group may benefit 
from its diverse portfolio by accessing a diverse pool of resources and information 
provided by multiple political parties. Moreover, the focal group may enjoy political 
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flexibility to the extent that it is unlikely to be negatively influenced by changes in 
political regime because its executives befriend with politicians of different political 
parties. As such, the focal group is able to maintain a relatively stable flow of benefits 
derived from its portfolio of political ties, which is particularly conducive to market entry 
activities, which require long-term and considerable investments (Siegfried and Evans, 
1994).  
However, a diverse portfolio of political ties may also induce several 
disadvantages. It requires higher maintenance costs than a homogeneous portfolio. 
Moreover, being friendly to all the political parties makes the focal business group less 
committed to the relationships with any political party, and thus damaging its ability to 
obtain scarce resources and tacit information. It also signals the disloyalty of the group to 
each political party, which may induce discrimination and retribution by powerful 
political parties.  
 In the context of post-transition period, the net effect of a portfolio of political ties 
on the market entries by the focal business group is contingent on the distribution of 
political power among rival political parties. We argue that the benefits of a diverse 
portfolio of political ties tend to be more prominent when the political power is evenly 
distributed than when it is dominated by the ruling party. When two different parties 
control the executive and legislative branches respectively, each of them is able to 
provide certain benefits utilizing their political power. Moreover, since the focal group 
enjoys a stronger bargaining position when the political power is dispersed, it is able to 
exploit diverse and abundant benefits provided by its political partners. The value of 
political flexibility provided by a diverse portfolio would also be particularly high when 
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political parties are equally powerful. Due to the intense competition between the ruling 
party and the opposition party, the chance of change in political regime is high, and hence 
enhancing the importance of keeping good relations with multiple political parties, each 
of which may become the new governor in the future. These advantages of a diverse 
portfolio are hardly realized by the focal group when the ruling party dominates both the 
executive and legislative authority. As opposition parties do not control any government 
institutions, ties to these parties do not provide resources and information that facilitate 
the focal group to expand the business scope. In such situation, a diverse portfolio does 
not provide heterogeneous benefits. Moreover, the focal group is less capable of 
mobilizing resources through its ties with the ruling party when the ruling party 
dominates the political arena and thus possesses a stronger bargaining position. 
Additionally, to the extent that the probability of change in political regime is relatively 
low when the ruling party has overwhelming political power, the value of political 
flexibility by maintaining a diverse portfolio of political ties is greatly depreciated.  
 On the contrary, the costs induced by a diverse portfolio of political ties are likely 
to be higher when the political power is dominated by the ruling party than when it is 
distributed dispersedly. This is mainly due to the increased probability of punitive actions 
taken by the ruling party. When it has both executive and legislative authority, the ruling 
party does not face great challenges from opposition parties and has a full control over 
public policies and resource allocation (Bonardi, Holburn and Bergh, 2006). Hence, ties 
to the ruling party become the sole channel through which the focal group is able to 
acquire resources and information to facilitate market entries. However, due to its weak 
bargaining power relative to the ruling party, the focal group is less able to obtain scarce 
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resources and sensitive information, and is more likely to become the target of 
discrimination and retribution due to its overt disloyalty. Comparatively, the costs of 
maintaining political ties to various political parties are much lower when the political 
power is distributed dispersedly. As a result of intense party competition, political parties 
become highly dependent on the focal group for its electoral support. Meanwhile, the 
focal group can resort to alternative political ties if its ties to the ruling party appear to be 
less effective.  Under such conditions, the focal group enjoys stronger bargaining power 
and is able to effectively inhibit the adoption punitive tactics by political parties.  
 Taken together, when the political power is relatively evenly distributed, 
maintaining a diverse portfolio of political ties is likely to generate considerable benefits 
while keeping related costs reasonably low. When the political power is concentrated in 
the hand of the ruling party, however, the benefits of a diverse portfolio of political ties 
are likely to outweigh the costs. Accordingly, we suggest: 
Proposition 3a: The more diverse its  portfolio of political ties to political actors 
with political power, the more entries into new industries by a business group 
when the political power is evenly distributed between the ruling party and one of 
the opposition parties.  
Proposition 3b: The more diverse its portfolio of political ties to political actors, 
the fewer entries into new industries by a business group when the ruling party 
has dominant political power.  
In summary, our theoretical analysis suggests that the institutional environment in 
which political ties are embedded shapes their efficacy on the market entries of business 
groups by influencing the mechanisms and outcomes of the interplay between connected 
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group leaders and political actors. The three-stage evolution of the institutional 
environment of emerging economies indirectly influence the growth of politically 
connected business groups in the form of expanding business lines by making the value 






















The Evolution of the Business-Government Relationship in Taiwan (1949-2004) 
The interaction between businesses and the state in Taiwan keeps evolving as a 
consequence of economic development and political and social change. In this chapter, 
we review the business-government relationship with a focus on interaction between the 
state and large business groups throughout three important periods: the authoritarian 
governance of KMT (Kuomintang) from 1949 to the mid-1980s, institutional transition 
from late 1980s to early 1990s, and the regime change in the early 2000s.  
 
Business-government relationships in an authoritarian regime (1949 to mid-1980s) 
After the Nationalist Party (KMT) retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 
1949, it dominated Taiwan’s politics and economy all the way up to 1987 (Gold, 1985; 
Wade, 1990). KMT established an authoritarian regime in which it exercised leadership 
in government, military and social organizations. Martial law was imposed for 38 years, 
the longest period in modern history. The formation of new political parties was 
prohibited and political opponents were persecuted, incarcerated and executed. Positions 
in government agencies and military were monopolized by KMT members. The 
legislative branch served as little more than a rubber stamp for the executive branch as 
the majority of legislators were KMT members and senior KMT members enjoyed 
permanent tenure. Such political regimes share several traits with those found in 
Communist countries and may be described as a quasi-Leninist regime (Cheng, 1989). 
To lay a solid economic foundation for the party-state dictatorship, KMT 
controlled critical economic resources by managing state enterprises. The state 
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enterprises monopolized the production of essential commodities in people’s daily lives, 
such as electricity, oil and gas. They also monopolized sectors such as petroleum, 
telecommunications, steel and shipbuilding. This monopolization not only gave the 
government control over people’s daily necessities and promoted industrial development, 
but also generated massive profits. Positions in state enterprises were often allocated to 
retired politicians and military personnel. Thus, the state enterprises were important 
resources at KMT’s disposal to consolidate political support (Baldwin, Chen and Nelson, 
1995).  
As state enterprises dominated large-scale production activities and seized 
monopolized rents, there was little space left for private enterprises. They had to seek 
opportunities in industries which were not under the state monopoly. In the 1950s, in 
order to facilitate the import-substitution industrial policy, the government promoted the 
development of industries, such as textiles, food, cement and plastics by financing firms’ 
importing of raw materials, paying the wages of employees, and providing marketing 
channels for their products. However, only a few large private firms received such 
preferential treatment by the government and the owners of these firms often had political 
affiliations with the KMT. For instance, benefiting from the government’s protection of 
the cement industry, Taiwan Cement Group developed into one of the most successful 
and prestigious business groups in Taiwan. Its chair, Koo Chen-Fu, had been a member 
of the KMT Central Standing Committee since 1981. His wife was a close friend of 
Soong May-Ling, President Chiang Kai-Shek’s wife. Other business groups that 
benefited from the government’s promotion policies include Formosa Plastic (chaired by 
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Wang Yung-Ching), Far East Group (led by Hsu Yu-Ziang) and Tainan Spinning, 
(founded by Hou Yu-Li, Wu San-Lien and Wu Hsiu-Chi) (Gold, 1985).  
The development of the private sector was also adversely affected by tight 
economic regulation, especially in the finance industry. Due to the restrictions on the 
foreign exchange market, firms resorted to domestic capital market for financing. Since 
the Taiwan stock exchange was underdeveloped at that time, banks were the major source 
of financial resources for private firms. Most banks were state-owned and special 
authorization was required to form new banks (Chu, 2001). As a result, large business 
groups were not able to maintain stable financing by establishing their own banks. The 
expansion of production scale was greatly restricted by the lack of sufficient financial 
support. To obtain capital from state-owned banks, private firms had to cultivate and 
maintain good relationships with KMT which had control over economic resources and 
the regulatory environment. To promote economic development and reinforce its 
authoritarian rule, KMT propped-up a few well-linked private firms by strategically 
allocating financial resources to them.  
Another conduit through which private firms interacted with the KMT was 
through the various business associations organized by KMT. The three most influential 
associations were the Chinese National Federation of Industries (CNFI) for the 
manufacturing sector, the General Chamber of Commerce of Republic of China 
(ROCCOC) for the service sector and the Industrial-Commercial Promotion Association 
(ICPA) which included Taiwan’s most important private firms. To get reliable and timely 
information about the activities of enterprises and implement its industrial policies 
effectively, the KMT often appointed business leaders who were KMT members or 
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supportive of KMT to chair business associations (Chu, 1994). Some businessmen were 
invited to sit on the KMT Central Standing Committee after chairing business 
associations. In fact, the first four chairs of the CNFI, Lin Ting-Sheng (Chairman of 
Tatung Group), Koo Chen-Fu (Chairman of Taiwan Cement Group), Hsu Sheng-Fa 
(Chairman of Prince Motors) and Kao Chin-Yen (Chairman of President Group) were all 
members of the KMT Central Standing Committee.  
Overall, during the authoritarian period, only large private firms who had political 
ties with KMT had access to economic resources and preferential treatment. However, 
they had little bargaining power over economic and political issues due to their high 
dependence on the KMT. The relationship between KMT and politically-connected 
business groups was mainly top-down.   
 
Business-government relationships during institutional transition (late 1980s to 
early 1990s) 
A large wave of political democratization and economic liberalization swept 
Taiwan, beginning in 1986. This was a consequence of pressure from the U.S. 
government for free trade (Baldwin, et al., 1995), and large-scale domestic social 
movements and political opposition (Wang, 1993). This great institutional transition 
changed the political and economic landscape of Taiwan dramatically (Tien, 1989).  
Political Democratization 
Martial law was lifted in 1987. Labor protests, new political parties and private 
mass media were allowed. The establishment of the major opposition party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) challenged the dominant position of KMT in 
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Taiwan’s politics. KMT had to seek support from businesses in elections. Large business 
groups which possessed a large amount of assets and employed a substantial number of 
workers became the major targets of KMT in their search for campaign contributions, 
votes and policy suggestions. In return, more seats were reserved for group leaders in the 
decision-making body of KMT. Out of the 150 seats in the KMT central committee, only 
2 were filled by businessmen before 1987. However, the number of seats allocated to the 
business community rose to 15 in 1993 and 33 in 1998 (Wu, 2000).   
As another response to the intense political competition, KMT expanded its party-
run business in both scale and scope by taking advantage of its political power as a ruling 
party. A KMT investment committee was formed to manage the party-run businesses. 
KMT enterprises operated in industries such as the mass media, finance, petrochemicals, 
steel, engineering, construction, shipping and electronics, most of which required 
significant investment. To reduce financial pressure and diversify investment risk, KMT 
enterprises usually invited large business groups to make joint investments and listed 
these firms on the Taiwan stock exchange. They also invited leaders of large business 
groups to participate in the decision-making process, making KMT enterprises and 
business groups closely intertwined with each other. The business groups which had 
partnerships with KMT enterprises include Yuen Foong Yu, Yulon, Shin Kong, Ruentex, 
Formosa Plastics, Far Eastern, Tatung, Tuntex and China Trust Financial Holding. The 
KMT enterprises achieved their best performance in 1999. Their aggregate assets were as 
high as 431 billion in Taiwanese dollars, ranking 8th among the 100 largest business 
groups (Business Groups in Taiwan, 2002). Net income was 14 billion, ranking 13th. The 
prosperity of KMT enterprises consolidated the position of KMT by not only providing 
 40
abundant financial resources for political competition, but also establishing strategic 
alliances with business groups, a major economic player in Taiwan’s economy.  
As a result of political democratization, the legislative branch became 
independent of KMT.  Since 1992, all legislators have been directly elected by the people 
of Taiwan rather than appointed by KMT. The legislative election has become an 
important institutional arrangement for interest groups. Taking advantage of their 
economic power, large business groups were able to send their delegates into the 
Legislative Yuan to influence the public policy process. For example, the director of 
China Rebar Group, Wang Ling-Lin was an elected legislator in the first, third and fourth 
legislative elections. Among the 161 elected legislators in the second legislative election 
in 1992, 50% of them were the director, chief manager, supervisor or consultant of firms. 
In the third legislative election, 15 elected legislators were directors and supervisors of 
listed firms. Participation in legislative elections became an effective approach for the 
business community to get involved in policy making, thus creating a favorable 
regulatory environment. 
Political Democratization and Political Ties 
The political changes mentioned above provided new opportunities for the 
building of political ties between business groups and KMT. For instance, among the 100 
largest business groups, 75% were connected to KMT in 19868. The proportion kept 
increasing from 79% in 1990, to 86% in 1994, and 90% in 1998. Moreover, the average 
number of political ties between KMT and a largest 100 business group increased rapidly 
during the institutional transition period. As shown in Table 3.1, it was 5.5 in 1986, 5.7 in 
1990, 6.6 in 1994, and 10 in 1998.  The standard deviation of political ties also enlarged 
                                                 
8 Details of data sources and the coding scheme of political ties are available in Appendix 1.  
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from 7.08 in 1986, to 7.69 in 1990, 8.07 in 1994, and 12.73 in 1998. China Trust was the 
most connected group with 40 political connections in 1986, 42 in 1990, and 69 in 1998. 
China Rebar exceeded China Trust in 1994 by having 53 political ties.  
Table 3.1 Political Ties to KMT Maintained by the 100 Largest Business Groups 
(1986-1998) 
 
 Average Number of Political Ties per Group Minimum Maximum S.D. 
1986 5.5 0 40 (China Trust) 7.08 
1990 5.7 0 42 (China Trust) 7.69 
1994 6.6 0 53 (China Rebar) 8.07 
1998 10.0 0 69 (China Trust) 12.73 
 
Economic Liberalization 
Together with political democratization, a series of economic liberalization 
policies were introduced. The exchange rates were mainly determined by market force in 
the international exchange rate markets after 1990. Policies for the privatization of state-
owned enterprises were put in place by 1989. Restrictions on entrance into most 
industries imposed by KMT in the 1950s were removed. As a result, business groups 
aggressively entered all the newly deregulated industries, such as banking, insurance, 
securities, telecommunication, public transportation, mass media, publishing, and power 
station. For instance, in the largest 30 business groups of 1999, 11 groups invested in 
commercial banks, 9 groups entered the telecommunications industry and 6 groups 
provided public transportation services. The deregulation of the finance industry was 
particularly important for business groups because they were able to tap into multiple 
financial sources, making them less dependent on KMT (Chu and Hung, 2002).  
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Table 3.2 shows the entry activities of the 100 largest business groups during 
1986-19989. On average, a business group entered 1.69 unrelated industries and 1.57 
related industries every two years. The generally increasing average number of entries 
into unrelated and related industries indicates that business groups entered more 
industries over time. With regard to the scale of market entry, the proportion of newly 
entered unrelated businesses to total group assets (11.43%) was smaller than the 
proportion of newly entered related businesses to total group assets (20.92%). This 
suggests that the scale of entries into related industries was greater than those into 
unrelated industries, which may be attributed to the fact that adjustment in unrelated 
industries often bears more risk than adjustment in related industries.  
As deregulated industries provide many unexploited opportunities, they are 
usually hot targets for business groups to enter.  It is found that business groups entered 
more deregulated industries over time, with the average number of entered industries 
increasing from 0.13 in 1986 to 0.38 in 1998. In addition, assets invested in newly 
entered deregulated industries account for 6.5% of group assets.  
 















Number of Business Groups 83 86 87 82 81 72 491  
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9 To track the entry activities of business groups every two years, we focus on those groups which appear in the 
consecutive two years in the Directory of Taiwanese Business Groups, the data source of business portfolios of the 100 
largest business groups. Therefore, the number of groups for each two-year period varies and is less than 100. 
10 Size denotes the average ratio of assets of entered or exited businesses to the total assets of sample groups over the 
period of 1986 to 1998.  
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Note:   1. Figures in parentheses are the average number of entries per period.  
2. Size in the last column denotes the average ratio of assets of entered businesses to the total assets of 
sample groups over the period of 1986 to 1998. 
3. Deregulated industries include finance, insurance, telecommunication, public transportation, mass 
media, publishing, and power. Traditional industries refer to agriculture industry, textile industry, food 
industry, machinery industry, chemical industry, and retailing industry. These industries emerged in 
Taiwan in the 1960s and are considered as the first set of industries that took off in Taiwan’s 
industrialization.  
 
Economic Liberalization and Political Ties  
Due to the various requirements to enter newly opened-up industries (e.g. “entry 
permit” to enter 42 sectors in 1987; large amount of assets to form new banks), not all 
business groups were able to seize the business opportunities by entering into new 
industries. Groups with political ties were in a relatively advantageous position and thus 
undertook market entries more aggressively than non-connected groups.  
Table 3.3A shows the differences between politically connected groups with non-
connected groups in their organizational characteristics, performance, and entry activities. 
The first row shows that 400 out of 491 sample groups (about 81%) had political 
connections. Politically connected groups are older and larger (measured in multiple 
dimensions) than non-connected groups, which is consistent with prior finding that large 
firms are more politically active because they possess necessary resources to commit to 
political activity (Epstein, 1980; Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Yoffie, 1987).  This finding 
also supports the argument that politicians prefer to build relationships with business 
groups with long history and large scale since these groups tend to be preferred partners 
for repeated games and/or rent-seeking behavior (Morck and Yeung, 2004). Row 6 
indicates that non-connected groups outperformed politically connected groups. This 
result is in line with the mixed findings regarding political ties and firm financial return 
(Bertrand, et al., 2004). Row 7 shows that groups without political ties had a higher ratio 
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of liability, suggesting that they used liability to finance their growth aggressively.  Row 
8 shows that politically connected groups were more diversified than non-connected ones, 
which is consistent with the recent findings that political ties promote the diversification 
of business groups (Chung, Mahmood, and Mitchell, 2008).  
Row 9 and Row 10 provide preliminary evidence to the relationship between a 
group’s political ties and its market entries. It is shown that compared to non-connected 
ones, groups with political ties entered into more unrelated industries and deregulated 
industries. For example, in 1996, one of the most politically connected groups, China 
Rebar, entered 8 unrelated industries and 3 deregulated industries. In contrast, among 
non-connected groups, Yageo Group entered the largest number of unrelated industries at 
5 (none of which was newly deregulated).  
 
Table 3.3A Organizational characteristics, performance, and market entry of 100 










1. Number of Groups 491 400 91  
2. Group Age 30 31 29 2* 
3. Total Assets  43627 51680 8231 43449*** 
4. Number of Employees 4926 5646 1764 3882*** 
5. Number of Group Affiliates 9.60 10.28 6.65 3.63*** 
6. Return on Assets 6.39 6.05 7.91 -1.86*** 
7. Liability/Assets Ratio 218.67 225.23 193.87 31.36*** 
8. Group Diversification 0.99 1.03 0.83 0.20*** 
9. Entry into Unrelated Industries 1.69 1.84 1.03 0.81*** 
10. Entry into Deregulated Industries 0.21 0.25 0.04 0.21*** 
   
  Note:    1. Group total asset is measured in million Taiwanese dollars.  
2. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Two tailed tests for all 
variables. 
3. Deregulated industries include finance, insurance, telecommunication, public transportation, mass 
media, publishing, and power. Traditional industries refer to agriculture industry, textile industry, food 
industry, machinery industry, chemical industry, and retailing industry. 
 
                                                 
11 Political ties refer to the personal relationships between business group leaders and political actors. The data source 
and coding scheme of political ties of the 100 largest business groups are available in Appendix 1.  
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Business groups develop political ties through a variety of ways. Based on an 
extensive survey on news reports and biographical sources (see Appendix 1 for details), 
we identified three most prevalent types of political ties as follows: (1) Formal ties, 
which arise when the same person occupies two positions, one in business arena and the 
other in political area. (2) Family ties, which arise when business leaders and political 
actors have family/intermarriage ties. (3)  Social ties, which arise when business leaders 
and political actors are close friends, from the same hometown, or members of the same 
trade associations/social clubs. As social network research has pointed out that types of 
social ties usually affect behaviors of actors and network outcomes (Adler and Kwon, 
2002; McEvily and Marcus, 2005), differentiating between types of political connections 
enables us to better understand the interaction between group leaders and politicians, and 
its impact on business groups.  
Table 3.3B shows the differences of business groups by types of political ties. 
Social ties are most prevalent among sample groups (384 out of 491), followed by formal 
ties (171 out of 491) and family ties (137 out of 491). Groups with formal and social 
political ties were older, larger and more diversified than non-connected counterparts, 
while groups with family ties did not have such characteristics except that they had more 
affiliates. Moreover, social ties were associated with poor group performance and low 
liability ratio, but formal and family ties did not affect groups’ financial profile.  
Regarding the effect on market entry, all types of political ties facilitated groups’ 
entries into unrelated industries.  Formal ties were most conducive to entries into 
unrelated industries, with formally connected groups entering 1.13 more industries than 
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groups without formal political ties12. Furthermore, the three types of political ties have 
differential effects on entry into deregulated industries. Groups with formal ties or social 
ties entered more deregulated industries than groups without such ties. However, family 
ties were not associated with entries into deregulated industries.   
Table 3.3B Organizational characteristics, performance, and market entry of 100 
largest business groups by types of political ties (1986-1998) 
 























1. Number of Groups 171 320  137 354  384 107  
2. Group Age 32 29 3*** 30.08 30.61 -0.53 30.89 28.93 1.95*** 
3. Total Assets  74546 27105 47441*** 48237 41843 6394 52364 12270 40094*** 
4. Number of Employees 76412 3475 4167*** 4420 5122 -702 5720 2078 3642*** 
5. Number of Affiliates 12.98 7.8 5.18*** 10.43 9.29 1.15** 10.32 7.06 3.26*** 
6. Return on Assets 6.58 6.29 0.28 6.67 6.28 0.39 5.98 7.88 -1.91*** 
7. Liability/Assets Ratio 44.47 46.40 -1.93 45.55 45.79 0.24 44.53 50.02 -5.48*** 
8. Group Diversification 1.20 0.88 0.32*** 1.06 0.97 0.09 1.03 0.86 0.17*** 
9. Entry into Unrelated 
    Industries 2.42 1.29 1.13*** 2.22 1.48 0.74*** 1.84 1.13 0.71*** 
10. Entry into Deregulated 
      Industries 0.31 0.16 0.15*** 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.25 0.07 0.18*** 
 
Note: 1. Group total asset is measured in million Taiwanese dollars.  
2. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Two tailed tests for all   
variables. 
3. Deregulated industries include finance, insurance, telecommunication, public transportation, mass media, 
publishing, and power. Traditional industries refer to agriculture industry, textile industry, food industry, 
machinery industry, chemical industry, and retailing industry. 
 
Overall, during institutional transition, the state-business relationship mainly 
centered on the interaction between KMT and business groups. Due to the political 
competition KMT faced and the participation of business leaders in the state legislative 
process, KMT and business groups became more independent of each other. They 
interacted as strategic partners through political elections, joint management of KMT 
enterprises and industrial deregulation. As a result, political ties between group leaders 
and KMT politicians proliferated and affected the resource profile, strategy, and 
performance of business groups in various ways.  
                                                 
12 Taiwan Cement Group, which had the most formal ties, entered 4 unrelated industries on average every two years.  
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Business-government relationships after a political regime change (since 2000) 
Since Taiwan completed democratic transition in late 1990s, the competition 
between political parties, especially KMT and DPP, has intensified. Parties come into 
power alternately and the political environment is full of uncertainty and turbulence. In 
the presidential election in 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-Bian was the unexpected 
victor and became the 10th–term President of the Republic of China. This was the first 
political regime change in modern Taiwanese history. Chen Shui-Bian was re-elected in 
2004. However, in the presidential election in 2008, the KMT candidate Ma Ying-Jeou 
won the presidency, taking power back from DPP. Table 3.4 shows the competition for 
presidency from 2000 to 2008.  
 
Table 3.4 Presidential Elections 
 
 
Another battle filed of party competition is the legislative election. As shown in 
Table 3.5, DPP won fewer seats than KMT in three consecutive elections took place in 
1998 (31% vs. 55%), 2001 (39% vs. 51%), and 2004 (40% vs. 50%) respectively. 
 
Presidential Election in 2000 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 4,977,737 39.3% Elected 
People First Party (PFP) 4,664,932 36.8 % Failed 
Nationalist Party (KMT) 2,925,513 23.1% Failed 
Others 96, 211 0.76% Failed 
Presidential  Election in 2004 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 6,470,839 50.11% Elected 
Nationalist Party (KMT)/People First Party (PFP)  6,443,022 49.89% Failed 
 
Presidential  Election in 2008 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 5,444,949 41.55% Failed 
Nationalist Party (KMT) 7,659,014 58.45% Elected 
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Table 3.5 Legislative Elections 
 
Year DPP KMT Others 
1998 70/225=31% 123/225=55% 32/225=14% 
2001 87/225=39% 114/225=51% 24/225=10% 
2004 89/225=40% 113/225=50% 23/225=10% 
            Note: Percentage numbers are the ratios of elected seats to total seats. 
 
Political Parties’ Response to Political Regime Change 
Along with the frequent changes in political regime, political parties were more 
dependent on the support from business groups to succeed in the intensive party 
competition. Consequently, both KMT and DPP made efforts to strengthen their linkages 
to business groups. However, as the party stepping down from power in 2000, KMT 
became less attractive for business groups. For example, without the protection of 
economic privileges, KMT enterprises performed poorly, with their net income ranking 
among the 100 largest business groups dropping from 13th in 1999 to 99th in 2001 
(Business Groups in Taiwan, 2004). Many business groups which had partnership with 
KMT enterprises were also negatively affected. Due to the decrease in KMT’s political 
and economic power, some business groups terminated the partnership with KMT so as 
to protect themselves from retribution from the newly-empowered DPP.  
As the new ruling party, DPP proactively made moves to build its networks 
within the business community so as to reinforce its governance. Unlike KMT, DPP did 
not have any party-run businesses, so support from large business groups was particularly 
important to it. Chen Shui-Bian invited group leaders who have been supportive to DPP 
to be national policy consultants. These leaders were the few who showed their loyalty to 
DPP even when KMT was in power. They displayed the same ideology as DPP and some 
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were treated poorly by KMT. For instance, the chair of Continental Engineering group, 
Ing Chi, was DPP supporter because of the KMT’s persecution of her father. Besides the 
supportive group leaders, Chen Shui-Bian also invited entrepreneurs who stayed neutral 
in the rivalry between KMT and DPP and even those with close relationships with KMT 
to be national policy consultants. Out of the 117 consultants, more than 20 were 
entrepreneurs, indicating that incorporating business leaders into national decision-
making process was an approach DPP utilized to establish its links within the business 
community.  
DPP also treated supportive firms favorably by providing them with large-scale 
public projects. A typical case is the construction of Taiwan high speed rail, which was 
the largest Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) construction project in Taiwan and the world’s 
biggest investment project (AsiaInc, 2004). It required investment as high as 450 billion 
Taiwan dollars (around US$14 billion). After intense competition among business groups, 
this project was contracted to five groups who were all supporters of DPP.  
To control financial resources in the national economy, DPP established a series 
of financial holding companies in which the state was the major shareholder and had 
control over the capital in these financial institutions. These financial holding companies 
were employed by DPP to lend debt to firms which were in alliance with DPP. The three 
largest financial holding companies controlled by DPP were Hua Nan, Mega and First 
Financial.  
In addition to getting connected to individual firms, DPP also enhanced its 
influence in business associations by appointing businessmen who were supportive of 
DPP as leaders of these associations. For instance, the chair of TECO Electrical & 
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Machinary group, Hwang Mao-Siung, who was close to DPP replaced Koo Lien-Song 
(chair of China Trust group and a member of KMT central committee) was appointed 
chairman of  the Chinese National Federation of Industries (CNFI).  
Changes in Political Ties since 2000 
Facing the frequently changing political regime, business leaders made 
investments in corporate political activities more strategically to maximize benefits and 
minimize political risks. This is reflected in changes in the composition of political ties 
between large business groups and major political parties after a political regime change 
in 2000.  
For instance, political ties maintained by the 100 largest business groups exhibit 
noticeable changes in the composition before and after 2000 (see Appendix 3 for details 
of data collection and coding). As shown in Figure 3.1A, in 1998, 58% of the largest 100 
business groups were connected only to KMT, but none of them had ties only to DPP. 8% 
of the groups maintained ties with both KMT and DPP and the rest 34% of groups were 
connected neither to KMT nor to DPP. Obviously, before the change in political regime, 
KMT was a predominant party in the interactions with business groups by having 66% 
groups connected to it.    
The situation changed dramatically in 2004. Figure 3.1B shows that the 
percentage of groups connected only to KMT dropped from 58% to 31%, while the 
percentage of groups connected only to DPP increased from 0% to 5%. Another 
significant change was that the percentage of groups tied to both KMT and DPP rocketed 
from 8% to 39%. Only 25% of the groups were not connected to either KMT or DPP. 
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Figure 3.1A Composition of Political Ties of 100 










Figure 3.1B Composition of Political Ties of 100 








The contrast between Figure 3.1A and Figure 3.1B suggests that more business 
groups were politically connected after the change in political regime in 2000. However, 
business groups changed their political strategy from getting closely linked to the ruling 
party to maintaining good relations with competing political parties. Rather than 
connecting only to KMT as of 1998, many groups also built ties with DPP. About 39% of 
 52
the groups were tied to both KMT and DPP, suggesting that groups diversified their 
portfolio of political ties in response to unexpected change in political regime.  
To examine the effect of portfolio of political ties, we categorize business groups 
by their ties to political parties and make comparison between them. There are four 
categories of business groups: groups connected only to KMT, groups connected only to 
DPP, group connected to both KMT and DPP, and groups not connected to either KMT 
or DPP. Table 3.6A and Table 3.6B show the differences in group characteristics across 
categories in 1998 and 2004 respectively13. In 1998, groups connected to both KMT and 
DPP did not differ from those with ties only to KMT except that the former were larger in 
terms of assets and employees. However, compared to non-connected groups, these two 
types of groups were older, larger, and more diversified, and engaged in market entry 
more aggressively. Their performance was poorer and they relied more heavily on 
liabilities to fund their business. 
 Table 3.6B indicates that in 2004, groups connected only to KMT were smaller, 
and more diversified than those connected only to DPP. The former performed worse and 
had a higher liability-assets ratio than the latter. Compared to those tied to both KMT and 
DPP, groups tied only to one political party were smaller, and less diversified, and 
entered fewer new industries. Groups with diverse political ties outperformed those 
connected only to KMT, but underperformed those connected only to DPP. In addition, 
groups connected only to DPP had a lower liability-assets than those connected to both 
KMT and DPP. With regard to the comparisons between connected and non-connected 
groups, there was not any change between groups connected only to KMT and non-
                                                 
13 As there was not any sample group which was connected only to DPP in 1998, there are three categories of groups 
shown in Table 3.6A.  
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connected groups from 1998 to 2004. The differences remained largely the same between 
groups connected to both KMT and DPP and groups not connected to either of them 
except that their difference in performance disappeared in 2004. Compared to non-
connected ones, groups connected only to DPP were larger and less diversified.  
As the above discussion indicates, in a pluralistic political environment, the 
business-government relationships become more dynamic and complex due to the 
increased political uncertainty. On one hand, political parties had stronger incentives to 
obtain support from business groups to succeed in the intensive party competition. On the 
other hand, group leaders make investments in corporate business activities more 
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Chapter IV 
Types of Political Ties and Market Entries of Business Groups in Emerging 
Economies 
Research on corporate political strategy is an exciting area because it advances 
our understanding of how firms manage their dependence on the government and 
uncertainty in the environment. Creating linkages with the government has been found 
particularly effective for firms to influence public policies and to obtain a variety of 
benefits (Fisman, 2001; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Peng and Luo, 2000).  
To the extent that firms employ various approaches to get connected to the government14 
and prior studies focus either on the aggregated business-government ties15 or on a 
specific type of such ties16, we know little about the effectiveness of various political ties 
to affect political decision-making and the achievement of firms’ goals. As social 
network literature has suggested that different types of social relations lead to different 
network outcomes (Podolny and Baron, 1997; Ahuja, 2000), bundling all political ties 
together may suppress the distinct effects of different types of ties. Given their limited 
resources, it is important for firms to understand the relative effectiveness of different 
types of political ties so as to optimize their investment in political efforts. Moreover, as 
firms usually maintain multiplex ties to the government, exploring the potential synergy 
and/or substitutability among various political ties sheds light on the optimal 
configuration of political networks.  
                                                 
14 For instance, business-government ties can be established through personal relations between business executives 
and political actors, such as friendship and kinship, and organizational linkages, including directorship and ownership 
ties.  
15 A case in point is the study by Faccio and her colleagues (2006), which examines whether managers’ political 
networking through formal position interlocks, relatives, and close friendships affect the availability of government 
bailouts to the politically connected firms.  
16 For example, Johnson and Mitton (2003) focus on how businessmen take advantage of their friendships with political 
leaders to acquire economic rents, while Okhmatovskiy (2009) considers the performance implications of political ties 
in the form of board and ownership relations.  
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This study aims to address these questions by examining how various political ties 
affect the market entries by firms in emerging economies. Specifically, rather than 
considering those arising from interorganizational relationships, we focus on political ties 
based on the interpersonal relationships between business executives and political actors. 
Emerging economies are largely relationship-based because interpersonal ties serve as 
informal institutions to substitutes for the underdeveloped formal institutions, such as 
laws and regulations (Xin and Pearce, 1996). As a result, business executives’ personal 
relationships with political actors play a dominant role in the business-government 
interaction (Li and Zhang, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000; Siegel, 2007). In emerging 
economies, personal connections may also lay a foundation for the establishment of 
organizational linkages between firms and the government. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that managers with close personal ties with government officials tend to have greater 
chance to win public projects bids (Schamis, 2002; Yang, 1994; Wealth Magazine, 2003). 
In addition, government officials often serve as directors of firms operated by their 
friends or relatives (Tenev and Zhang, 2002; Phan, Lee, and Lau, 2003). The 
investigation of interpersonal political ties thus enables us to understand the essential 
mechanisms and dynamics of business-government interactions in emerging economies.   
Rather than viewing ties between business executives and political actors as 
generic conduits for interplay between a firm and the government, we suggest instead that 
different types of political ties characterized by distinct relationships between connected 
parties will have differential effects on the firm’s market entries. Based on the 
relationship between the connected executive and political actor, we distinguish three 
types of most prevalent political ties: formal tie, family tie, and social tie. Drawing on the 
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perspective of political embeddedness, literature of corporate political activity, and social 
network theory, we present an integrative framework of how the three types of political 
ties influence market entry. We argue and demonstrate that the effect of a particular type 
of political ties on market entry depends on (1) the extent to which connected executives 
and political actors are willing to reciprocate each other and prefer to solve problems 
within the relationships rather than through exit (i.e. depth of political embeddedness), (2) 
the range of political actors executives can reach through this type of ties (i.e. breadth of 
political embeddedness). The three types of political ties, which are characterized by 
distinctive properties, lead to different depth and breadth of political embeddedness of a 
firm, and hence affect the firm’s market entry activities differentially. Furthermore, a 
firm keeping diverse political ties is likely to enjoy an additional boost to market entry 
because different types of political ties complement each other such that the firm’s 
embeddedness in its political environment becomes deeper and broader.  
We use the largest 100 business groups in Taiwan as the research setting to test 
the validity of our framework. Business groups, consisting of legally independent firms 
under common administrative and financial control, are ubiquitous in almost all emerging 
economies (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). They often dominate a substantial fraction of a 
country’s productive assets and contribute significantly to national GDP and employment. 
In response to the market-oriented transition sweeping emerging economies since 1980s, 
business groups have frequently entered into new industries (Hoskisson, et al., 2004). We 
focus on the market entry activities by Taiwanese business groups between 1986 and 
1998, during which extensive economic liberalization took place in Taiwan. The large-
scale of market entries conducted by Taiwanese business groups, together with the 
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extensive and heterogeneous political ties of group leaders provide a particular 
appropriate setting in which to examine our research questions. Our empirical analysis is 
conducted using an extensive longitudinal dataset involving 491 group-year observations 
belonging to 144 unique business groups. The results of analysis are supportive of our 
arguments: the effect of political ties on market entry is clearly and predictably 
contingent on the type of political ties, and the combination of those ties.  
Our study aspires to contribute to five streams of literature. First, we contribute to 
the literature of corporate political activity by highlighting the differential role of 
alternative types of political ties in market entry when the political networks involve 
different types of ties.  Based on the characteristics of political embeddedness induced by 
different types of political ties, we identify how various political ties affect the market 
entry of business groups both individually and in combination. This provides implications 
for firms about how to choose the most effective type of political ties to achieve desirable 
goals and how to construct favorable political networks that stimulate complementarities 
between different types of political ties.  
Second, we enrich the nascent perspective of political embeddedness (Michelson, 
2007; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008) by theorizing and empirically testing how the depth 
and breadth of a firm’s political embeddedness determined by various political ties affect 
its interaction with the government, and thus the achievement of desirable goals. We also 
highlight that types of political ties greatly influence a firm’s embeddedness in its 
political environment to various degrees.  
Third, this study advances market entry literature by identifying political ties as a 
driving force of market entry. In contrast to prior research which emphasizes how internal 
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resources of a firm influence its expansion into new industries (Chang, 1996; Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002), this study switches the focus to a firm’s linkages to an important 
player in the external environment, the government. It indicates how political ties affect 
market entries by shaping opportunity sets and competitive environment faced by firms.  
Fourth, we extend the social network research by providing theoretical and 
empirical support to the argument that types of ties play an important role in explaining 
network outcomes (Burt, 1997; Ahuja, 2000; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Zaheer and 
Bell, 2005) in the context of political networks.  
In addition, this study sheds light on the business group literature by highlighting 
that the “contact capability” of group leaders, which is the ability to link to domestic 
regulators for resources and permits (Kock and Guillén, 2001), is contingent on the type 
of relationships between group leaders and connected political actors. It also provides 
managerial implications for business group leaders about how to choose the appropriate 
types of political ties to achieve desirable outcomes.   
The reminder of this study is organized as follows: First, we develop our 
theoretical framework and research hypotheses; next, we describe our research setting, 
dataset, and methods to test these hypotheses; finally, we present the results of empirical 
analysis and discuss their theoretical and managerial implications.  
 
TYPES OF POLITICAL TIES, POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS, AND MARKET 
ENTRY 
Social network research has suggested that network ties based on distinct 
relationships between connected parties are heterogeneous in the mechanisms and content 
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of social exchanges involved (Podolny and Baron, 1997). Such differences between types 
of ties have strong explanatory power to network outcomes. In the context of 
interorganizational networks, for instance, Gulati and Westphal (1999) find that the 
nature of CEO-board relationships affects the formation of strategic alliances by 
influencing the level of trust between corporate leaders. McEvily and Marcus (2005) 
show that joint problem-solving ties with suppliers (but not with customers) are 
significantly related to the acquisition of firm capabilities.   
Extending these insights to political networks, we argue that interpersonal 
political ties, originating from heterogeneous relationships between the connected 
business executives and political actors, also tend to affect the market entry of politically 
connected firms differentially. Specifically, we consider three types of prevalent political 
ties: (1) Formal ties, which arise when the same person occupies two positions, one in 
business arena and the other in political area; (2) Family ties, which arise when business 
leaders and political actors have kinship or intermarriage relations; (3) Social ties, which 
arise when business leaders and political actors are close friends, from the same 
hometown, or members of the same trade associations or social clubs. To investigate the 
efficacy of the three types of political ties on market entry, we first draw on the nascent 
perspective of political embeddedness which elaborates what determines the 
effectiveness of firms’ political efforts through their embedded ties with the government. 
Building on the embeddedness argument in sociology and organization theory 
(Granovetter, 1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), the perspective 
of political embeddedness views firms as embedded in ongoing social relations with the 
government (Michelson, 2007).  These relations can be formal or informal, and range 
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from the bureaucratic, instrumental, to affective ties to the state and its actors. The 
political embeddedness of a firm facilitates or derails the attainment of its objectives by 
affecting its ability to influence public policies, mobilize resources, and preserve 
autonomy (Okhmatovskiy, 2009; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). In particular, two 
dimensions of a firm’s political embeddedness are likely to determine the effectiveness of 
its political strategies, namely the depth and breadth of political embeddedness (Oliver 
and Holzinger, 2008). Firms embedded deeply in their political ties search for solutions 
to problems within the relationships (Uzzi, 1997) and are likely to bear the costs and risks 
associated with their close relationships with the government, such as government 
intervention, and burdens of compliance to public policies (Keim and Baysinger, 1988; 
Shaffer, 1995). In contrast, firms embedded widely in the political environment have 
access to a broad range of politicians and thus search widely for solutions across 
relationships (Lester, et al., 2008). It is argued that firms with deep and broad political 
embeddedness are more able to mobilize their political ties to shape public policy 
(Dawkins, 2002; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  
Types of political ties are likely to affect the depth and breadth of a firm’s 
political embeddedness. As individuals tend to employ distinct rules of social exchange 
to interact with people with different types of relationships (Hwang, 1987; Chen, Chen, 
and Xin, 2004), various political ties, which are characterized by distinct behavior and 
interactions between the connected business executives and political actors, may embed 
firms in political environment to different depth and breadth.  
In particular, we propose that political embeddedness induced by formal ties is 
characterized by high depth and low breadth. With interlocking positions in both 
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businesses and the state, the individual involved in a formal tie acts as a politician and a 
business leader simultaneously. This dual identity enables him/her not only to utilize 
political power at disposal to facilitate the pursuit of economic benefits by the connected 
firm, but also to mobilize resources possessed by the firm to achieve political goals, such 
as winning elections. Due to the free flows of resources, information, and influence 
between business and political arenas through the interlocked individuals, firms with 
formal ties are able to impose great influence on political decision making, and at the 
same time are strongly affected by changes in the political situation. However, it is worth 
noting that the scope of formal ties is quite narrow as individuals are not able to hold 
multiple interlocking positions due to constraints on time and energy, as well as on their 
expertise, knowledge, and skills.  
In terms of family ties, their political embeddedness varies depending on the 
closeness of kinship. Governed by informal norms such as unconditional trust, family 
obligation, and altruism (Luo and Chung, 2005; Peng, 2004), immediate family members 
(e.g. father and sons/daughters, husband and wife, sibling) are bound to help each other 
whenever it is necessary. Political ties between immediate family members are thus 
particularly valuable for firms to seek help and create favorable conditions for market 
entries. In the meantime, such ties also place burdens on firms to support and/or help out 
family politicians for the interest of the whole family. To the extent that immediate 
family members are deeply engaged in the relationship and are confined to a limited 
scope, we expect them to induce political embeddedness with similar depth and breadth 
to formal ties. However, political ties between distant family members (e.g. uncle and 
nephew; distant relatives) are likely to be characterized by lower depth of political 
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embeddedness because connected family members care less about the interest of the 
overall family and thus bear relatively weak obligation to help with each other. Moreover, 
due to the distant relationship, they tend to hold distinct opinions about the same issue, 
making it harder to reach consensus and make collective efforts to fulfill desirable goals. 
But distant family ties tend to have a broader range than immediate family ties as more 
family members are involved. 
Social ties are associated with political embeddedness of low depth and high 
breadth. Compared to the other two types of political ties, social ties are more 
instrumental in nature and people embedded in the relationships interact with each other 
under the norm of reciprocity. Consequently, people within the relationship are motivated 
to devote themselves to joint problem solving and risk sharing in the expectation of 
fairness and voluntary reciprocity in the future (Uzzi, 1997). Otherwise, they may switch 
to alternative relationships which appear to be more beneficial or less costly. Regarding 
the breadth of political embeddedness, social ties are likely to provide access to the 
widest range of connected political actors among the three types of political ties. Rather 
than constrained by the limited opportunities and high costs incurred in establishing 
formal and family ties, business executives can easily enlarge the scope of their social 
political ties by making friends with political actors through face-to-face interactions, 
such as meetings and banquets (Yang, 1997). Networks composed of social ties are more 
likely to be rich in structural holes, further expanding the breadth of network contacts 
(Burt, 1992).  
The attributes of political embeddedness characterized by different types of 
political ties bear important implications for the market entry of politically connected 
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firms. On one hand, deep political embeddedness may facilitate proactive market entries 
by mobilizing abundant resources, information, and privileges through connections to the 
state. It may also force politically connected firms to expand into certain industries as 
compliance to industrial policies of the government. On the other hand, broad political 
embeddedness may enhance firms’ ability to search for business opportunities and access 
diverse resources and information that promote proactive market entries. But it may 
derail forced entry activities since firms bear limited obligations to expand business 
portfolios in the interest of connected politicians. Therefore, to understand how different 
types of political ties affect market entry, we need to consider how depth and breadth of 
political embeddedness induced by each type of ties jointly influence firms’ motivation 
and capability of business expansion.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
Types of Political Ties and Entry into New Industries 
The role of formal ties 
To maximize their business achievement, individuals embedded in formal ties are 
highly motivated to search for business opportunities across industries. Taking advantage 
of their political power, they are likely to facilitate market entry by contributing to the 
acquisition of reliable information, mobilization of resources, and enhancement of 
legitimacy.  
In emerging economies, credible information is a scarce resource. Because of the 
shortest path of information exchange, information transferred through formal ties is 
more accurate and credible than that through other types of ties (Hansen, 1999). Sensitive 
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or confidential information may also be available to connected firms due to their top 
officers’ embeddedness in political circle. This enables firms to better detect future 
directions of economic growth and industrial development, and to timely identify market 
opportunities (Chu, 1994; Fields, 1997; Luo, 2003).  Moreover, the information 
advantage of formal ties extends beyond information acquisition to information 
interpretation. Drawing on their own experience and opinions of colleagues in political 
circle, executives embedded in formal ties are able to understand public policies deeply 
and comprehensively (Hillman, et al., 1999; Lester, et al., 2008), and make wise 
decisions about the timing, direction and approach of market entry accordingly.  
Formal ties also promote firms to enter new industries by mobilizing resources under 
control of interlocked political actors. Due to their stakes in the connected firms, political 
actors are likely to do their utmost to seize business opportunities in new industries by 
providing firms with valuable resources, such as capital, human resources, advanced 
technology, regulatory advantages, and favorable treatment (Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Siegel, 2007; Peng, Lee, and Wang, 2005; 
Xin and Pearce, 1996).  Furthermore, taking advantage of their comprehensive 
understanding of situations in both political and business arena, interlocked political 
actors are able to timely update and improve the resource profile of connected firms in 
accord with environmental changes and trends, and hence enhance the chance of 
successful industrial expansion (Chang, 1996; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991).  
Another mechanism through which formal ties promote market entry is through the 
enhancement of firms’ legitimacy. It has been shown that the demographics and 
experience of a firm’s leaders are critical to their firm’s legitimacy because leaders serve 
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a symbolic role (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Firms having representatives serving in a 
political capacity in U.S. enjoy higher profitability partially due to their legitimacy that 
occurs from identification with a highly legitimate entity, the government (Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999). As business leaders holding political positions are 
regarded highly legitimate, firms with formal ties are likely to be conferred with high 
legitimacy and enjoy the concomitant benefits, such as enhanced ability to acquire 
resources (Baum and Oliver, 1991).   
Besides facilitating proactive market entries, formal ties may also force connected 
firms to enter new industries at times. To accelerate economic development, the 
government of most emerging economies usually formulates industrial policies which 
intend to stimulate the development of certain sectors which are of strategic importance 
to the national economy. As a result, the government requests firms to enter into these 
industries. For instance, at the early stage of industrialization of Korea in the 1960s and 
1970s, the government designated “strategic sectors”, such as cement, steel, construction, 
shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and petroleum refining (Westphal, 1990). In response to the 
government initiative, some firms diversified into these sectors and emerged as 
diversified business groups by utilizing the foreign technology and capital provided by 
the government (Kim, et al., 2004). Although the government often provides incentives, 
including subsidies, foreign technology, marketing channels, with firms to expand 
business portfolios, the high risk entailed by operating in new industries makes firms 
cautious in investing industries in which they have no prior experience. Compared to 
non-connected rivals, firms with formal ties may be obliged to take such risk in the 
interest of connected political actors. Interlocked political actors are inclined to divert 
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firms’ resources to new industries if the benefits of doing so (e.g. enhanced political 
status and achievement of political goals) outweigh the costs (e.g. economic losses in 
newly-entered industries).   
Overall, the deep political embeddedness incurred by formal ties exerts a positive 
effect on market entry and such effect tends to be stronger than that of other types of ties 
for two reasons. First, formal ties serve as the most efficient conduits through which 
material and immaterial substances of political arena are transferred to the connected 
firms due to shortest transfer path and the absence of opportunistic behavior and disputes 
arising from interest conflicts between multiple parties. Second, to the extent that 
individuals embedded in formal ties pursue both economic and political goals, connected 
firms are bound to bear the trade-off between the two. Although formal ties are less likely 
to have diverse information and resources, and provide access to fewer alternative 
political contacts because of their low breadth of political embeddedness, we expect this 
negative effect to mitigate the positive effect of formal ties to a limited extent. To the 
extent that marketing entry is of strategic importance to firms, business leaders rely more 
on credible information provided by formal ties than on heterogeneous but less reliable 
information from social and family ties when making decisions. Moreover, although 
firms may resort to more political actors through family and social ties, these contacts are 
not as devoted as those in formal ties to resource provision and risk sharing, implying 
their limited value-adding effect on market entry. Therefore, we propose that formal ties 
impose the strongest positive effect on market entry among the three types of political 
ties. 
The role of family ties 
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 Besides taking political positions by themselves, business leaders often get 
politically embedded through family members playing leading roles in government 
agencies, parliament, and political parties (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Farh, 
et al., 1998; Kang, 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2004). Similar to formal ties, family ties are 
also conducive to market entries of connected firms by providing motivation for 
proactive entries, obligation of forced entries, and superior capability of mobilizing 
political capital of connected politicians. However, the two types of ties differ in the 
sources of market entry advantages. While the advantages of formal ties primarily 
originate from the pursuit of individual achievements in both business and political 
arenas, the main sources of family advantages are the common goal of maximizing 
family interests, family trust and loyalty. To maximize family interests, political actors in 
family ties utilize their political power to aggressively search for business opportunities 
and provide supportive information and resources to connected firms. Studies have 
shown that family ties are conducive to the development and performance of firms by 
providing property rights protections, efficient financing, and information acquisition in 
emerging economies (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Peng, 2004). Firms with 
family ties may also enjoy legitimacy conferred by the connected political actors (Peng, 
2003). For the political career of family members, firms embedded in family ties may be 
also obliged to enter industries designated by the government as compliance to industrial 
policy (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).  
However, we expect these positive effects on market entry to be less pronounced for 
distant family ties than for immediate family ties due to their distinct depth of political 
embeddedness. The ability of firms to mobilize the political capital of politicians may be 
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affected by the closeness between family members and the extent to which they value 
family interests. Family members with close kinship and sharing a common goal of the 
family tend to be more beneficial than those with remote kinship and consequently 
divergent interests. Furthermore, as immediate family members enjoy high level of 
mutual trust, the social exchange between them is likely to be more efficient than that 
between distant family members. Although distant family ties are able to provide more 
diverse information, resources, and political contacts than formal ties and immediate 
family ties due to their higher breadth of political embeddedness, we expect them to be 
less conducive to market entry. Due to the nature of decision making on market entry, 
more weight is often put on the credibility and criticality rather than heterogeneity of 
resources and information transferred through political ties. As a result, the advantage of 
distant family ties in wide scope is not likely to compensate for their disadvantage in the 
lack of deep political embeddedness. Hence, we expect the positive effect of immediate 
family ties on market entry to be stronger than that of distant family ties.  
The role of social tie 
Previous studies have shown that another type of contacts in business leaders’ 
political networks are alumni from their schools, friends acquainted with in trade 
associations and social clubs, or people from the same hometown (Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006; Park and Luo, 2001; Siegel, 2007). The social relations facilitate 
exchanges between business leaders and political actors by providing informal 
governance mechanisms based on trust cultivated through enduring interactions, 
accumulated favors, and the norm of reciprocity (Luo and Chung, 2005; Uzzi, 1996, 
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1997). They also incur reciprocal obligations on politically connected firms to expand 
into certain industries in response to industrial policies of the government.    
However, due to the lack of a common goal, such as to pursue individual 
achievement and to maximize family interests embodied in formal and family ties 
respectively, business leaders and politicians embedded in social ties are less committed 
to the relationships and tend to switch to alternatives when risks and costs accrued are 
high. As a result, social ties may not provide information as rich and credible as the other 
two types of ties. Scarce resources and legitimacy are less likely to be leveraged by firms 
through social ties. By the same token, firms may be reluctant to accept the request from 
socially connected politicians to enter certain industries.  Therefore, the market entry 
advantages of social ties accrued from depth of political embeddedness turn to be the 
least manifest among the three types of political ties.  
Yet social ties are characterized by broader political embeddedness compared to the 
other two types of ties. Hence, they are more likely to provide diverse information, 
resources, and political contacts.  We argue, however, that the advantage of diversity 
does not add much value to market entries by connected firms. First, information from 
heterogeneous sources is less consistent and reliable due to the longer path of exchange 
and potential bias induced by the control of political actors who bridge structural holes 
between their rivals and business leaders (Burt, 1992). Hence, business leaders are not 
likely to make strategic decisions, such as diversifying into new markets, based on such 
information. Second, as there might be rivalry and hostility among various political actors 
(Huntington, 1968), firms embedded in social ties have to incur costs resulting from 
political struggles, such as discrimination and retribution (Siegel, 2007), which 
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significantly mitigate the benefits of diversity. Taken together, we expect social ties to 
facilitate market entry to the least extent among the three types of political ties. In line 
with the discussion above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of political ties between business leaders of a business 
group and political actors on the group’s  entries into new industries will be 
contingent on the type of political ties: the positive effect of formal ties and 
immediate family ties will be stronger than that of distant family ties and social ties. 
 
Complementarities in entry into new industries 
 While H1 indicates that each type of political ties promotes market entries to 
certain extent, the combination of various political ties is likely to provide an extra boost 
by enlarging the depth and breadth of firms’ political embeddedness. Firms embedded 
deeply and widely in the political environment tend to enter more new industries because 
of their ability to acquire a wide range of high-quality resources and information (Oliver 
and Holzinger, 2008; Uzzi, 1997), while minimizing the costs of networking with 
heterogeneous political contacts. 
Specifically, we argue that the advantages of formal ties and social ties may become 
more salient when they are used in combination.  Firms with both formal and social ties 
are able to acquire diverse information to conduct effective environmental scanning 
(Aguilar, 1967; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). In the meantime, they may filter such 
information through formal ties and keep reliable and rich information as the basis for 
decision making. Access to a broad scope of contacts through social ties enables the 
political actors embedded in formal ties to exchange for heterogeneous resources with 
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multiple colleagues, and to enhance the legitimacy of their firms (Baum and Oliver, 
1991).  
Moreover, the potential costs of maintaining relationships with multiple political 
actors might be minimized when firms have formal ties. To the extent that business 
leaders of the focal firm are political actors, they tend to prefer those who share similar 
political ideology and stand when constructing their political networks. Hence, there is 
less chance for the firm to be connected with political rivals. Even if competing political 
actors are involved through social ties, they are less likely to discriminate or to retaliate 
against the focal firm considering the political power of its business leaders.   
Family ties are similar to formal ties in the sense that they are characterized by 
higher depth and lower breadth of political embeddedness relative to social ties, we 
propose that the above interactive effects between formal and social ties are applicable to 
the combination of family and social ties. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2a: A business group will enter more industries when its business leaders 
maintain both formal and social political ties than when its business leaders 
maintain either formal or social political ties.   
Hypothesis 2b: A business group will enter more industries when its business leaders 
maintain both family and social political ties than when its business leaders maintain 
either family or social political ties.   
When firms have both formal and distant family ties, they are likely to enjoy an extra 
advantage of market entry. To the extent that distant family ties encompass a wider range 
of political actors than formal ties, the combination of formal and distant family ties 
enlarges the breadth of political embeddedness of the focal firm, and thus generates 
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benefits arising from deep and wide search within political networks. Furthermore, in the 
presence of formal ties, the commitment of distant family members to the relationship 
may be reinforced. As the family members bridging the business and political arenas tend 
to be thought highly of, they may strengthen the unity of family members and enhance 
the valuation of family interests using their influence within the family. Consequently, 
family members in political circle are more likely to devote themselves to resource 
provision and information exchange with the focal firm, while connected business leaders 
are more obliged to contribute to the political career of their family members, both of 
which will lead to more market entries by the focal firm. Therefore, we propose that:   
Hypothesis 2c: A business group will enter more industries when its business leaders 
maintain both formal and distant family political ties than when its business leaders 
maintain either formal or family political ties.   
 
RESEARCH SETTING: BUSINESS GROUPS IN TAIWAN (1986-1996) 
We use Taiwanese business groups as the research setting to test our hypotheses. 
Business groups are a leading economic actor in Taiwan’s economy. They dominate a 
substantial fraction of productive assets and influence the economic development of 
Taiwan (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). The contributions of the 100 largest Taiwanese 
business groups to the national GDP rose from 28.6% in 1981 to 54.3% in 1998 (Chung 
and Mahmood, 2006). They provide an ideal empirical setting to investigate my research 
question for four reasons.  
First, group leaders and political actors in Taiwan are widely connected in various 
forms. Group leaders may directly serve as government officials, legislators, or political 
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party leaders themselves. They may also indirectly connect to the political circle through 
interactions with friends, family members, or people from the same hometown holding 
political positions. For instance, Koo Chen-Fu, former chairman of Taiwan Cement group, 
was not only a member of KMT Central Standing Committee, but also a close friend of 
President Lee Teng-Hui. The proliferation and heterogeneity of political ties kept by 
Taiwanese business groups enables us to explore the effectiveness of different political 
ties on market entry by business groups.  
Second, Taiwanese business groups are usually controlled by their founding families 
and the authority of decision making is centralized in the hands of business group leaders. 
This leadership structure enables group leaders to leverage their personal social capital 
for corporate purpose (Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Luo and Chung, 2005). Anecdotal 
evidence has shown that business group leaders’ social networking with members of the 
dominant political party, government officials and legislators plays an important role in 
shaping firm strategy and performance (Cheng and Chu, 2002; Fields, 2002). For 
instance, the China Trust Group successfully expanded into newly opened-up sectors 
with high profit margins, such as finance, telecommunication, and mass media, by taking 
advantage of the rich political capital possessed by its former chairman, Koo Chen-Fu.  
Third, entry into new industries takes place primarily at business group level rather 
than at firm level in Taiwan (Chung and Luo, 2008). In response to the economic 
liberalization since 1986, business groups have undertaken extensive market entry into 
newly-opened sectors either by establishing new member firms or by changing the core 
business of existing member firms. This provides an ideal setting for us to examine the 
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relationship between group leader’s political ties and the expansion of business portfolios 
by business groups. 
In addition, Taiwan offers clear definitions of group membership. Group 
boundaries are ambiguous in some countries, making it difficult to track market entry 
activities and group leaders’ political networks. In Taiwan, however, strong cultural 
foundations such as patrilineal family connections and regional kinship delineate group 
boundaries clearly (Numazaki, 1986). Moreover, the easy identification of the largest 
private owners and directors of Taiwanese business groups makes it possible to identify 
the network ties between group leaders and political actors.  
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Data source and sample 
The empirical analysis is based on extensive longitudinal data of the largest 100 
business groups in Taiwan from 1986 to 1998. The primary data source of this study is 
the Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) directory, compiled biennially by the China Credit 
Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. CCIS is the oldest and most prestigious credit-
checking agency in Taiwan and an affiliate of Standard & Poor’s in the United States. 
The BGT directory collects information on the top 100 groups in sales and is confined to 
groups whose principal firms are registered in Taiwan. CCIS defines a business group as 
“a coherent business organization including several independent enterprises.” Since its 
second edition (published in 1974), BGT has consistently maintained the following 
criteria in its selection of business groups: (1) more than 51 percent of the ownership 
must be native capital; (2) the group must have three or more independent firms; (3) the 
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group must have more than NT$100 million in total sales17; (4) the core firm of the group 
must be registered in Taiwan. This directory is the most comprehensive and reliable 
source for business groups in Taiwan. Several previous studies rely on this source (e.g. 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2005).  
For each business group, the directory provides information about its top management, 
size, history and financial performance. For each member firm, it provides information 
about its line of business, upon which we identified its core industry. Since there is not 
ready-to-use industry coding in the BGT directory, we assigned the firm a 2-digit 
industrial code following the 2000 version of the Standard Industrial Classification 
published by the Taiwanese government. After aggregating the industry information of 
all member firms to the group level, we compared the industrial profile of the group 
between t and t+1. Industries with different 2-digit SIC codes are regarded as unrelated 
industries. Groups entered unrelated industries if distinct 2-digit industries which were 
not present at t appeared at t+1 in their business portfolios. We focus on group entry into 
unrelated industries rather than related ones because this is the major pattern of industrial 
expansion adopted by business groups (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Hoskisson, et al., 
2005; Kock and Guillén, 2001) and the high risk and costs accrued make business groups 
more dependent on political ties (Kang, 2002). As a robustness check, however, we also 
examine the relationship between political ties and entries into related industries (defined 
as industries with the same 2-digit SIC codes but different 4-digit SIC codes compared to 
existing SIC codes of a group).  
To track the entry activities of the largest 100 business groups, we collected 
information on their industrial portfolio every two years (i.e. 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 
                                                 
17 This criterion has changed over the years as groups have become bigger. 
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1994, 1996, and 1998), which covers all periods in which relevant information is 
available. Since it takes time for political ties to take effect on market entries, the two-
year window spans a moderate period in which the impact of political ties is likely to be 
fully captured. To track the change of industrial portfolios over time, we only included 
groups which were present in two consecutive issues of the BGT directory. After deleting 
observations with missing values, our final sample consists of 491 group-year 
observations concerning 144 unique groups.  
We collected information about political ties between group leaders and political 
actors by referring to a wide set of publicly available data sources, including the website 
of the directory of the Taiwanese government (http://twinfo.ncl.edu.tw), the website of 
the parliament (http://www.ly.gov.tw) and the Excellent Business Database System 
(EBDS) (http://ebds.anyan.com.tw). For formal position interlocks, we collected data on 
key position-holders in both business groups and the political circle. By cross-checking 
the names of top officers of business groups (i.e. CEO, Chairman of the board, major 
shareholders of group affiliates, directors and auditors of listed group affiliates) with the 
names of political actors (i.e. head of state, national and provincial administrators, 
members of national and provincial legislatures and judiciary, key figures of the 
dominant political party, KMT), we identified formal political ties maintained by the 
sample business groups. Regarding family political ties, we identified the kinship and 
marital relations between group leaders and political actors. A group is considered to be 
politically connected through a family tie if a relative of one of its group leaders, as 
defined above, is a political actor. Moreover, based on the closeness of kinship, we 
further differentiate two finer categories of family ties: ties b
 78
members and ties between distant family members. Social political ties can come about in 
one of the three ways: (1) close friendships, (2) same home-town relationships, and (3) 
common trade associations and/or social clubs memberships between group leaders and 
political actors. The detailed information about data sources and coding schemes of 
political ties is available in Appendix 1.  
Compared to the measure of political ties in prior research, our approach to 
measurement is improved in three ways. First, instead of adopting indirect approaches by 
using subject rating, indexes and reports collected by other agencies (e.g. Fisman, 2001; 
Bertrand, et al., 2004), this paper uses a more direct approach that locates specific ties 
between business executives and politicians. Second, almost all existing studies have 
adopted synchronized research designs, examining political ties and firm strategy within 
the same period. We collected data of political ties for three time periods (1986, 1990 and 
1994). As the change in the number of political ties over 2 years is relatively small 
(Hamilton, 1997), we expanded the data by assuming that the number of political ties in 
1988 is the same as in 1986. We created the data of political ties in 1992 and 1996 based 
on the data of 1990 and 1994 respectively. The longitudinal data allows us to examine 
potential endogeneity and reverse-causality in the relationship between political ties and 
market entry. Third, we collected group-level rather than firm-level information on 
political ties. The comprehensiveness of the data enables us to examine how the political 
networking of top officers of a business group affects the diversification strategy of the 
whole group.  
Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of Taiwanese business groups in our sample. The 
size of business group in terms of the number of affiliated firms increased over time. On 
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average, there were about 10 member firms in a business group during the period of 
1986-1996. Moreover, the percentage of politically connected groups increased from 
75% as of 1986 to 83% as of 1996. Overall, 81% of the sample groups maintained 
political ties from 1986 to 1996. Regarding the entry activities, the average number of 
unrelated industries a business group entered rose from 1.41 in 1986 to 2.51 in 1998. 
Each group entered 1.69 unrelated industries on average throughout the period studied.  
********** Table 4.1 about here ********** 
Dependent variable: Entry into new industries 
To test the proposed relationships between political ties and market entry, we 
counted the number of entries into new 2-digit SIC industries in a 2-year span (1986-
1988, 1988-1990, 1990-1992, 1992-1994, 1994-1996,1996-1998). We intend to explain 
the entry activities in the above periods using the political ties maintained by business 
groups in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996 respectively.  
Independent variables: Three types of political ties 
We use the number of interpersonal ties between group leaders and political actors as 
the independent variable. In particular, we distinguish three types of political ties and 
create three variables accordingly. Formal tie is defined as the number of formal position 
interlocks in which business leaders serve as political actors, and vice versa. Family tie is 
defined as the number of familial and marital ties between business leaders and political 
actors. Immediate family tie is the number of ties between immediate family members, 
while distant family tie is the number of ties between distant family members. Social tie 
refers to the number of ties between business leaders and political actors in the form of 
close friendships, same hometown relationships, or common membership of trade 
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associations and/or social club.  
Control variables 
Following previous studies (Chang, 1996; Khanna and Palepu, 2000), we controlled 
for a set of group characteristics that may affect entry activities of a business group, 
including group size, group age, group ROA, group debt ratio, group diversification, 
family ownership, and the core industry of the group. Group Size is measured by logged 
total group assets, adjusted by the 2000 consumer price index (Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, 2000: 179). Group age is the number of years since the first member firm of a 
group was established. Group ROA refers to the annual group return on assets. Group 
debt ratio is the ratio of group liability to its total assets. Group diversification has been 
found to enhance group performance by promoting economies of scope (Amsden and 
Hikino, 1994; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). We use the following formula to measure it: 
),/1ln( jj PP ×∑ where jP is defined as the percentage of group sales in industry sector j 
(Palepu, 1985). As most business groups in Taiwan are family-owned (Chung and 
Mahmood, 2006), family ownership is likely to influence important group strategies, such 
as market entry. Family Ownership at the group level is an aggregated measure of firm-
level ownership data. Family ownership in a member firm is the percentage of shares 
owned by individual family members and other member firms controlled by family 
members18. We then used a weighted average of family ownership (weighted by member-
firm assets as a percentage of total group assets) in all member firms to calculate the 
group-level family ownership. As entry and exit activities are often related (Chang, 1996; 
Chung and Luo, 2008), we controlled for the number of exits from incumbent 2-digit SIC 
                                                 
18 A family member is defined as an individual with the same last name as the group founder or an individual with 
different last name but appears in the group founder’s family tree.  
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industries. In addition, we controlled for the core industry of a group using industry 
dummies. Industry with the largest proportion of group sales was coded as the core 
industry of a group19.  
In addition to group characteristics, the promise of new industries is also likely to 
affect entry activities by business groups. We created two industry-level variables to 
capture such effect. Industry Profitability is the aggregation of the ROA of industries that 
business groups entered weighted by the percentage of group sales in the entered 
industries. Industry Sales, which indicates the industry attractiveness in terms of volumes 
of sales, is measured as aggregate sales in industries that groups entered, weighted by the 




 Table 4.2 reports summary statistics and correlations between variables. It is 
shown that business groups kept more social ties than formal and family ties. Regarding 
each type of ties, there is sufficient variation in the number of ties across groups. 
Meanwhile, there is significant heterogeneity in entry activities among groups. The 
heterogeneity in political embeddedness and entry activities of business groups enables 
us to examine the extent to which political ties affect market entry.  
********** Table 4.2 about here ********** 
Regression results 
                                                 
19 12 industries are identified as core industries of sample groups. They are agriculture, food, textile, wood, chemical, 
non-metallic, metals, machinery, electrical/electronic, construction, real estate and financial services and retailing. On 
average, the core industry contributed 67% to group sales.  
 82
We use the random-effect negative binomial model to test the empirical implications. 
The negative binomial model is appropriate for analyzing count data when over-
dispersion of the conditional mean and variance functions violates the assumptions of 
Poisson regression (Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, random-effects models are preferred 
over fixed-effects models because the core industries of some business groups did not 
change over time (Greene, 1993).   
Table 4.3 reports pooled regression results of the effects of political ties on groups’ 
entry into new industries. Model 1 contains only control variables, serving as a baseline 
model. In Model 2, the addition of variables of various types of political ties improve the 
overall model fit over Model 1 (d.f.=3, P<0.01). The inclusion of the interaction term 
between formal tie and social tie in Model 3 improves the overall fit compared to Model 
2 (d.f.=1, P<0.05). Similarly, the overall fit of Model 4 and Model 5 gets improved with 
the inclusion of the interaction between family tie and social tie (d.f.=1, P<0.01), and 
between formal tie and distant family tie (d.f.=1, P<0.01) respectively.  
********** Table 4.3 about here ********** 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that formal ties and immediate family ties are more conducive 
to groups’ expansion into new industries than distant family ties and social ties. To 
ensure the effects of different types of political ties comparable, we standardized the four 
variables of political ties by making their mean at 0 and standard deviation at 1. The 
results in Model 2 show that the coefficients of four types of ties take on the expected 
positive signs and are statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of coefficients 
differs, with the ones for formal tie (0.341) and immediate family tie (0.328) much larger 
than those for distant family tie (0.011) and social tie (0.013). We conducted Wald test to 
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examine the equality of the coefficients statistically. The results indicate that the 
coefficients of formal tie and immediate family tie are greater than those of distant family 
tie and social tie with statistic significance at 1% level respectively. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1, which proposes differential effects of types of political ties on market entry, 
is supported. In a negative binomial model, a unit change in an independent variable X 
leads to changes in the expected count, Y, by a factor of exp(β), holding other variables 
constant. As shown in Model 2, an increase in one formal tie is related to 40.6% increase 
in the number of unrelated industries entered (β=0.341, [exp(0.341)*1-1]=0.406) and one 
more immediate family tie is related to 38.8% increase in the number of market entries. 
In contrast, one more distant family tie is associated with 1.1% increase in the number of 
market entries and one more social tie is related to 1.3% increase in the entry into 
unrelated industries.  
Hypothesis 2a predicts formal tie and social tie complement each other in promoting 
the market entry by a focal business group. To test this hypothesis, we added the 
interaction term between formal tie and social tie in Model 3. The expected positive sign 
(P<0.05) of the interaction term provides supportive evidence to Hypothesis 2a. It 
suggests that for a group with one formal tie, an increase of one social tie is related to a 
6.6% increase in the number of unrelated industries it entered.  
Model 4 examines the complementary effect between family tie and social tie, which 
is proposed in Hypothesis 2b. It is shown that the interaction term between family tie and 
social tie takes on a positive sign and is statistically significant (P<0.01). Hence, 
Hypothesis 2b is supported. The finding in Model 4 implies that for a group with one 
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family tie, an addition of one social tie is associated with a 7.6% increase in the number 
of unrelated industries it entered.  
Hypothesis 2c proposes a positive interactive effect between formal tie and distant 
family tie. We tested this hypothesis by adding the interaction term between the two 
types of tie into Model 5. It is shown that the interaction term displays a positive trend 
and is statistically significant (P<0.01). This is consistent with our prediction in 
Hypothesis 2c. Moreover, the results indicates that for a group with one formal tie, an 
increase of one more family tie is related to a 4.4% increase in the number of its entries 
into unrelated industries.   
Sensitivity checks 
We subjected the results from Table 4.3 to several sensitivity checks. First, we redo 
the analysis shown in Table 4.3 using two alternative dependent variables. Prior research 
has found that a firm’s political strategies are particular effective for the achievement of 
desirable goals which are greatly influenced by government policy (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999). As regulated industries are heavily influenced by the government, the advantages 
of various political ties in facilitating entry into these industries may be more salient. 
Therefore, we ran the same models included in Table 4.3 using the number of regulated 
industries entered as an alternative dependent variable. We found that there are greater 
differences between types of political ties in their positive effects on entry activities, and 
that the complementarities among types of political ties remain. The second alternative 
dependent variable we choose is the number of entries into related industries. Contrary to 
the findings about entries into regulated industries, we found the positive effects of all the 
four types of ties reduced. The main effect of social ties and its complementarity with 
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formal ties lose statistic significance. These results may be due to the less risks and costs 
involved in expansion into related industries relative to unrelated industries.  
Second, as there are repeated observations of the same business groups across 
periods of time, these observations may correlate with each other. We addressed the 
potential for within-group correlation by allowing clustering for the possibility of 
correlations among different years within groups. The results remain materially 
unchanged.  
Third, since only groups which appear in two consecutive issues of the BGT 
directory are included in our sample, the composition of groups in different two-year 
waves is different. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the unbalanced panels, 
we analyzed a subset of business groups that are present in six waves (32 groups) with 
the same models and found our results remained. 
Checks for reverse causality  
The evidence so far shows a strong correlation between political ties and business 
groups’ expansion into new industries. However, we should interpret this result with 
caution because it is possible that entry into new industries leads to the establishment of 
political tie. For instance, politicians may prefer to partner with diversified business 
groups which are more likely to provide votes and campaign contributions due to their 
large scope of production. In the meantime, the more diversified a business group, the 
higher the probability for the group to interact with politicians in different settings. We 
address this causality issue in several ways. First, by comparing the emergence of 
political ties to the timing of entries into new industries, we observed that the personal 
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relationships between group leaders and political actors in our dataset largely predate the 
entry activities of connected business groups.  
Second, we ran a set of regressions using the change of various types of political 
ties between period t and t+1 as dependent variable, and the number of entered industries 
in t as independent variable. The control variables remain the same. The regression 
results show that the coefficient of the number of entries is not significant across all the 
models, suggesting that entries into new industries by business groups are not associated 
with the change of political ties maintained by group leaders.  
Third, we followed a novel econometric approach proposed by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) that calls for identifying the theoretical mechanisms by which political 
ties are supposed to promote the market entry of business groups and demonstrating their 
working empirically. Specifically, we argue that if political ties were to benefit market 
entry by providing information and resources, the positive effects of political ties will be 
strongest for groups with less efficient internal markets, which are found to play an 
important role in resource sharing and filling institutional voids in external environment 
(Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). These groups may resort to linkages 
with the government as alternative sources of resources, information, and informal 
mechanisms governing exchanges. We used the density of network ties (including buyer-
supplier relationships, cross-shareholdings, and interlocking directorates) among member 
firms within a business group as a proxy for the efficiency of its internal markets. As the 
internal market operates based on intra-group ties and dense networks have been found to 
enhance the efficiency of exchanges (Coleman, 1990; Ahuja, 2000), we added density of 
intra-group networks as a control in the regressions shown in Table 4.3 and found robust 
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results. By scrutinizing one of the theoretical channels by which political ties affect 
market entry, we thus provide a stronger case for causality. 
In addition, we used the propensity score approach (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) to 
further address the endogeneity problem. Basically, we compared the entry activities 
between two sets of business groups: politically connected groups vs. non-connected 
groups. By classifying the two sets of groups into different blocks based on their 
propensity to be politically connected, we estimated the difference between connected 
and non-connected business groups in their market entries across blocks. It turned out 
that the differences are significant in most blocks, providing supportive evidence to our 
arguments and findings. The details of the propensity score analysis are presented in 
Appendix 2.  
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
We began by noting that while recent research has began to establish the role of 
business executives’ political networks in shaping firm strategy and performance, there is 
lack of understanding about the heterogeneity of political ties and its implications for the 
effectiveness of corporate political strategy. Drawing on the perspective of political 
embeddedness and social network literature, we propose that one way to advance this 
research agenda is to consider how different types of political ties offer distinct levels of 
political embeddedness, and to consider further how this difference in political 
embeddedness can explicitly explain the extent to which a firm’s political ties affect its 
motivation and capability of market entry.  
We conceptualized and tested this perspective in the context of business groups in 
Taiwan, and we showed how the different types of political ties maintained by business 
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group leaders related to their groups’ expansion into new industries. Specifically, we 
argued that the three types of political ties studied differ in their contributions to the 
depth and breadth of a firm’s political embeddedness, and thus facilitate the firm’s 
market entries to differential extent. Given the ability of formal ties and immediate family 
ties to provide strong stimuli and valuable support for entry activities, we predicted and 
found that groups with formal ties or immediate family ties were advantageous in 
expanding business portfolios. Both distant family ties and social ties were found to be 
conducive to market entry, but their positive effects were weaker than those of formal ties 
and immediate family ties. We also found support for other hypotheses that addressed 
how the mix of various political ties further contribute to market entry by deepening and 
widening a firm’s political embeddedness. The finding of this contingency in the entry-
political tie relationship is a particular original contribution to the literature, we believe, 
and our evidence on the differences in the depth and breadth of political embeddedness 
among types of ties gives us greater confidence in our focus on how different types of 
political ties can affect market entries individually and in combination.  
By offering an integrative study about how different types of political ties influence 
entry activities, this study provide implications for five streams of prior research. With 
respect to research on corporate political strategy, this study highlights that political ties 
are not homogenous in terms of their properties and concomitant effects on firm strategy, 
and provides a theoretical basis for the predictably differential effects of different types 
of political ties. In essence, differences in type of political ties maintained by a firm 
greatly influence the firm’s exposure to opportunities, resources, and obligations, and 
therefore have important implications for its entries into new industries.  
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Moreover, we provide a fine-grained look at three types of political ties most 
prevalent in emerging economies. Formal ties and immediate family ties contribute more 
to market entry possibly due to stronger stimuli for market entry and the superior ability 
to mobilize valuable support. Although positive, the effects of distant family ties and 
social ties are weaker. This might be due to the lower depth of political embeddedness 
induced by the two types of ties. Our study also shows the interactive effects among 
different types of political ties. This not only provides additional evidence on the 
heterogeneity of political ties, but also advances our understanding of whether and how 
synergies arise from mix of various political ties.  
We hope that our study has also contributed to the emerging perspective of political 
embeddedness in three ways. First, we provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
implications of the depth and breadth of a firm’s political embeddedness for its strategy 
implementation. To our knowledge, this is the first large-sample empirical study about 
how the two dimensions of political embeddedness can combine to affect firm strategy. 
Our findings provide supportive evidence to the core argument of this perspective, which 
says that a firm’s ability to generate institutional influence is determined by the depth and 
breadth of its embeddedness in the political environment (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  
Second, while numerous studies have identified a variety of benefits resulting from 
political embeddedness, relatively less attention has been paid to “dark side” of political 
embeddedness20. Our study responds to Baum and Dutton’s (1996) call to study both the 
value and constraint of embedding and provides a more complete understanding of the 
impacts of political embeddedness. Specifically, we point out that while enjoying benefits, 
                                                 
20 A noticeable exception is Siegle’s study (2007) about how the unexpected change in political regime can convert a 
firm’s political capital into political liability.  
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firms with deep political embeddedness are also exposed to higher probability of 
government intervention and those with wide political embeddedness may become 
victims of political struggles between connected politicians. In addition, we go beyond 
the traditional proxies of political embeddedness, such as the tenure and position of 
connected political actor (Lester, et al., 2008), and instead use the types of political ties to 
gauge how the depth and breadth of political embeddedness can combine to affect firm 
behavior.   
Focusing on how a firm’s political embeddedness affect its expansion into new 
industries, this study also enriches the market entry literature by extending driver of 
market entry from the firm’s internal resources to its linkages to the external environment. 
Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of the conditions under which politically 
connected firms enter new industries proactively or passively. Managerial implications 
can also be drawn by firms as to how to manage their business portfolios by considering 
the individual and interactive effects of different types of political ties.  
Lastly, using business groups in emerging economies as research setting, we also 
seek to contribute to research on business groups by responding to Khanna and Yafeh’s 
(2007) call to incorporate the interface between business groups and their institutions, 
such as polity, and thus develop a more complete research program of business groups. 
Moreover, we provide a more complete understanding of the “contact capability” of 
business group leaders (Kock and Guillén, 2001) by identifying types of political ties as a 
contingency in the effectiveness of such capability. Our findings of the relative efficacy 
of various political ties also provide managerial implications for group leaders. For 
instance, rather than forcing his daughters marry someone whom she does not like, a 
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group leader himself should take a political position so as to enter target industries. 
Additionally, given their constrained time and resources, instead of focusing exclusively 
on formal ties, business group leaders need to cultivate multiplex political ties to enjoy 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3 Political ties and entry into new industries using random-effect negative 
binomial models  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Control variables      


























































































Independent variables      








Family tie   0.154** (0.062) 
0.161*** 
(0.057)  
Immediate family tie  0.328*** 
(0.094)   
0.319*** 
(0.088) 
Distant family tie  0.011*** 
(0.004)   
0.012*** 
(0.004) 








Formal tie * Social tie   0.064** (0.026)   
Family tie *Social tie    0.073*** (0.017)  











Log likelihood -763.85 -753.02 -748.17 -741.96 -738.52 
Number of observations 491 491 491 491 491 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.  
          Standard errors are in the parentheses. 









The Portfolio of Political Ties and Market Entries of Business Groups  
in Emerging Economies 
Recent studies have indicated that political actions of the firm is an important 
component of the overall strategy formulation and has substantial impact on firms’ 
behavior and performance in developed as well as emerging economies (Baron, 1995; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999). However, the existing corporate political 
strategy literature primarily focuses on business-government (administration) interactions, 
and relatively less attention has been paid to another important power segment—the 
political parties. Although some research has indicated that firms often adopt various 
political tactics, such as campaign contributions and constituency building, to support 
their favored political parties (Epstein, 1984; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Zeithaml, Keim, 
and Baysinger, 1988), we know little about how firms decide to target their political 
tactics at which political parties to achieve desirable goals. To the extent that political 
parties play an important role in the landscape of political power by setting policy 
agendas, nominating candidates for officials and legislators, monitoring the work of 
elected representatives, and controlling government institutions and policies if they win 
the elections (Schlesinger, 1991), the overlook of interface between business and political 
parties makes our understanding of the political strategies of firms incomplete21. 
Moreover, since party competition holds important implications for the organization of 
governments which substantially affects the policy making processes and results through 
interactions between executive and legislative branches (March and Olsen, 1989; Scott, 
                                                 
21 A few studies included a firm’s ties to political parties in its pool of political ties (e.g. Faccio, 2006; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003), but they did not differentiate ties to political parties from other types of political ties (e.g. ties to 
government officials and legislators) and thus provided limited insight about how the interplay between firms and 
political parties influences political strategies of firms.   
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2001), scholarly understanding of the efficacy of firms’ political strategies targeting the 
government will be further improved when the relationships between firms and political 
parties are taken into consideration. 
Given the limited resources of firms, it is important to understand how firms can 
maximize the value received from interactions with political parties by targeting the right 
political parties at the right time. This study seeks to address this agenda by examining 
how a firm’s portfolio of political ties to different political parties affect firm’s 
diversification strategy such as entries into unrelated industries. Specifically, we 
investigate how the rivalry between political parties, as seen in many political systems 
(Huntington, 1968; Pasuk and Baker, 1995; Wad, 2002), affect the behavior and outcome 
of politically connected firms. We also explore the configuration of optimal portfolios of 
political ties that promote the expansion of business scope by politically connected firms. 
Integrating the insights from research on portfolios of network ties, resource dependence 
theory, and corporate political strategy literature, we argue and show that when political 
power is evenly distributed among political parties as a result of party competition, a 
diverse portfolio of political ties facilitate market entry. However, when there is 
substantial power distance (or popularity in terms of vote) between political parties, a 
diverse portfolio can inhibit entry into new markets. In addition, the effectiveness of 
political ties is contingent on the characteristics of the focal firm such as firm resources. 
The internal resources of the firm weaken the relationships between political ties and 
market entries. 
A political tie here refers to a personal relationship between a business executive 
and a party leader. A portfolio of political ties hence is a collection of political ties 
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between the focal firm and different (and even opposing) political parties. Borrowing 
from the network literature the concept of egocentric network, which encompasses the 
focal firm (ego), its set of partners (alters), and their connecting ties (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994), we call this egocentric portfolio of political ties. We choose to focus on the 
portfolio of political ties rather than single, independent dyadic ties for two reasons. First, 
the composition of a portfolio reflects how the focal firm targets its political tactics at 
political parties. Specifically, a diverse portfolio composed of ties with different political 
parties implies that the focal firm targets multiple political parties, while a homogeneous 
portfolio suggests that the focal firm concentrates its political tactics on a single or a few 
political parties. Second, despite the widespread belief that political ties are an important 
channel for the interaction between business and polity (e.g. Hillman, Zardkoohi, and 
Bierman, 1999; Peng and Luo, 2000; Siegel, 2007; Xin and Pearce, 1996), the political 
tie literature has largely focused on the impact of individual dyadic ties and regarded each 
political tie as an isolate conduit rather than an interdependent component in a portfolio 
of ties. The current literature has achieved limited success in explaining how political ties 
maintained by a firm as a collectivity may shape the firm’s strategy and profitability.  
In regard to the network literature, the value of portfolio of ties is mainly 
conducted in the context of alliance network where firms share common goals and create 
value through resource sharing and co-development of products, services, or technologies 
(Gulati, 1998). This line of research suggests that the value created by the focal firm from 
network ties depends not only on individual ties, but also on the portfolio of ties as a 
whole due to the interdependencies between ties (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Baum, 
Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Lavie, 2007). Investigating portfolios of political ties 
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thus enables us to fully account for the impact of political ties on firm’s new market entry. 
Moreover, due to the unique nature of portfolios of political ties, this study also enriches 
the network literature by examining outcomes of portfolios of ties which involve 
competition between alters of the focal firm and punitive actions taken by alters on the 
focal firm. 
We situate the theoretical arguments using business groups in emerging economies. 
Business groups are sets of legally-independent firms, operating in multiple industries 
which are under a common administrative and financial control through various formal 
and informal relationships within groups (Chang and Hong, 2000; Granovetter, 1995; 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Business groups are ubiquitous in virtually all emerging 
economies, producing a significant portion of the national GDP and hiring a substantial 
number of employees (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Business 
groups suit this study for several reasons. First, entry into new industries has been a 
major response of business groups in emerging economies to market-oriented transitions 
sweeping these countries since the 1980s (Hoskisson, et al., 2004). Groups usually 
diversify into unrelated industries by taking advantage of their superior ability to set up 
and manage projects in diverse industries (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Kock and Guillén, 
2001).  Moreover, business groups often maintain extensive political ties to political 
parties in their countries (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Group 
leaders and political actors interact with each other intensively for exchange of 
information and resources. In addition, after the “third wave” of political democratization 
in many emerging economies, the establishment of new political parties is allowed, 
leading to intense party competition and even rivalries (Huntington, 1991; Sachs and 
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Warner, 1995).   
We use the 250 largest Taiwanese business groups (1998-2004) as the empirical 
setting for four reasons. First, Taiwanese business groups have undertaken extensive 
entry activities since the economic liberalization of Taiwan in the late-1980s (Chung and 
Mahmood, 2006). Second, embedded in a relationship-based society, leaders of 
Taiwanese business groups keep extensive personal relationships with party leaders. 
Third, with the establishment and growth of new political parties since 1986, the 
dominant role of the Nationalist Party, the KMT, in the politics of Taiwan has been 
challenged. The competition among political parties in the presidency and legislative 
campaign was intense during 1998-2004. Finally, the clear-defined group boundaries of 
Taiwanese business groups enable us to accurately track the entry activities of group 
affiliates and political ties maintained by group leaders (Luo and Chung, 2005).  
This study makes three major contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
contributes to the corporate political strategy literature by examining the political 
portfolio that firms can adopt to shape the political environment when facing rivalry 
between political parties. Specifically, we identify the conditions under which firms 
should (or should not) develop a diverse portfolio of political ties. We hence establish the 
direct and contingent conditions under which political ties facilitate or hinder the entry of 
business groups into new industries. Second, it contributes to social network research by 
exploring the optimal portfolio of network ties by considering how the rivalry among 
network alters and the interdependencies between the focal firm and alters affect the 
strategy of the focal firm in the context of political networks. It shows that the desirable 
properties of portfolios of network ties depend on the nature of relationships among 
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network partners. Further, this study broadens the market entry literature by highlighting 
the contingent value of political ties and showing how the political capital and internal 
resources possessed by a firm jointly affect its market entry. By adopting a holistic 
approach, we are better able to see the hitherto unobserved connections between the 
market entry literature and corporate political strategy research.  This study also provides 
supportive empirical evidence to the theoretical argument that the capability of business 
groups to exploit their political capital in emerging economies facilitates their expansion 
into unrelated industries (Kock and Guillén, 2001).  
 
RIVAL POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PORTFOLIO OF POLITICAL TIES, AND 
MARKET ENTRIES 
Current alliance research shows that impacts of alliance portfolio on the focal firm 
depend on the attributes of partner firms, the nature of relationships between the focal 
firm and its partners, and the relationships among its partners (Baum, Calabrese, and 
Silverman, 2000; Lavie, 2007; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). This line of literature 
suggests that the focal firm benefits from an alliance portfolio composed of prominent 
partners (Stuart, 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005), partners with heterogeneous resource 
profile (Burt, 1992; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Rodan and Galumi, 2004), partners 
which are not competitors of the focal firm (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Lavie, 
2006), and partners competing with each other (Lavie, 2007).  
Building upon these insights, we further develop a theoretical framework of the 
efficacy of portfolios of political ties by taking into account the prominence of connected 
political parties, the nature of relationships between the focal firm and connected political 
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parties, as well as among political parties in its portfolio. It intends to provide insights 
into the design of portfolios of political ties.  
Party competition and distribution of political power 
The political science literature defines a political party as a team “seeking to 
control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Downs, 
1957). In many political systems, we see two or more political parties compete for the 
control of government institutions. In democratic contexts, the competition is carried out 
through periodic general elections. The party (or coalition of parties) winning the 
majority of votes gains control of the government institutions until next election. 
However, in democratic nations with distinct electoral systems, the relationship between 
the executive branch and legislative branch is different, and thus the distribution of 
political power between parties controlling certain government institutions vary across 
nations22. The following discussion about party competition uses presidential systems as 
the institutional context.  
 Presidential elections and legislative elections are the major battlefields of party 
competition (Hungtington, 1968). When it wins the majority votes in the presidential 
election, a political party or coalition gains executive authority and becomes the ruling 
party. When it wins the majority seats in the legislative election, a political party or 
coalition achieves legislative authority. If a political party controls both legislative and 
executive authority, it dominates domestic politics and has a mandate to political power. 
                                                 
22 For instance, in parliamentary countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, the executive branch is typically a 
constituent part of the legislative branch (Moe and Caldwell, 1994). The majority party which wins in the legislative 
election controls both the executive and legislative branches. In presidential countries, such as the United States, 
however, there is a significant separation of political power between the executive branch and the legislative branch 
(Hillman and Keim, 1995). Political control of the legislature does not guarantee a party control of the executive branch 
since the chief executive is elected separately and may be from another party. To the extent that the political power is 
more concentrated in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems (Hillman and Keim, 1995), the theoretical 
framework developed in this study which focuses on the strategic interaction of firms and rival political parties closely 
applies to firms operating in countries with presidential systems. 
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The government is thus under unified party control which often leads to cooperation 
between the president and his colleagues in the legislative branch (Sundquist, 1988; Cox 
and Kernell, 1992). If different parties control the legislature and executive branches, the 
political power is relatively evenly distributed among the ruling party (executive) and the 
opposition party (legislature). The government under divided party control is referred to 
as a divided government (Cox and Kernell, 1992). As a result, there may be less 
opportunity for the majority party or coalition in the legislature to control policy making 
and the legislative agenda (Alt and Lowry, 1994). In United States, for example, the 
result of competition between the Democratic and the Republican parties in presidential 
elections and congressional elections determines presidential-congressional relations 
(Oleszek, 1984).  
The distribution of political power determines the prominence of political parties 
or coalitions as alters in a focal firm’s political networks. In a unified government, the 
ruling party which controls both legislative and executive branches is the most prominent 
partner for the focal firm as it shapes the competitive environment faced by the firm 
through enacting policies, and monitoring regulatory agencies, bureaus, and judiciary 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; 
Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). In contrast, the opposition parties without control 
over the legislative branch are the least attractive alters as they are not able to exert 
significant influence on public policies and implementation. Comparatively, in a divided 
government, the ruling party with executive authority and the opposition party with 
legislative authority are moderately prominent alters because they are able to influence 
policymaking and implementation to certain extent. Furthermore, the prominence of 
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political parties in the focal firm’s political networks also influences the relative 
bargaining power of the focal firm and thus the outcomes of its portfolio of political ties.  
Bargaining power and efficacy of portfolios of political ties on market entry 
Studies on interfirm network suggest that being connected to diverse alters 
benefits the focal firm by providing heterogeneous information and resources, thus 
enabling the firm to achieve desirable goals such as improved performance, successful 
implementation of strategies, and higher growth rate (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; 
Burt, 2000; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001). In 
the context of political networks, however, maintaining political ties with multiple 
political parties may not be always beneficial primarily because powerful political parties 
have punitive power over the focal firm and are able to levy retaliation costs, which are 
the additional costs beyond withdrawing some existing benefits supplied to the focal firm 
(Lawler and Bacharach, 1987). A firm having political affinities with opposition parties 
often becomes the target of retribution by the ruling party (Siegel, 2007). In addition, the 
prominence of connected political parties may change dramatically as a result of general 
elections or forced regime changes (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).  
We argue that the benefits and costs derived from a diverse portfolio of political 
ties hence hinge upon the focal firm’s relative bargaining power vis-à-vis political parties 
in its portfolio, which determines the extent to which it can refrain from retribution by 
powerful parties and the value it can receive from political ties. Through political ties, the 
focal firm exchanges votes, campaign contributions, and policy support for information, 
resources, and administrative privileges with political parties23 (Baron, 1995; Benson, 
                                                 
23 Political ties originating from a common political ideology do not necessarily involve exchanges between the focal firm and 
its political partners, and thus the bargaining between them. However, this type of political ties may indirectly affect market 
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1975; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Bargaining power refers to 
the ability to favorably change the terms of agreements, to obtain accommodations from 
partners, and to influence the outcomes of negotiations (Schelling, 1956; Yan and Gray, 
1994). When the focal firm is in a stronger bargaining position, the cost of taking 
punitive actions by powerful political parties is high because the focal firm may 
consequently come up with unfavorable agreements to political parties which may lead to 
their failure in political elections. Hence, powerful political parties are unlikely to employ 
their punitive capability. Moreover, the focal firm is more likely to gain desirable 
outcomes from negotiations with political parties by taking advantage of its strong 
bargaining power. When the focal firm has relatively weak bargaining power, however, 
powerful political parties may use punitive tactics without bearing much cost because the 
focal firm is unlikely to withdraw the existing benefits supplied to political parties given 
its high dependence on them. At the same time, the benefits the focal firm can explore 
from political ties with congenial parties are likely to decrease given its inferior position 
in negotiations.  
Resource dependence theory indicates that bargaining power derives from the 
interdependence between the focal firm and its partners (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
bargaining power of the focal firm in a bargaining relationship depends on two 
dimensions of interdependence: (1) the stake it has in the exchange; (2) the availability of 
alternatives (Bacharach and Lawler, 1984). The lower the stake in a relationship and the 
more alternatives the firm has, the more bargaining power the firm has over its partners in 
the relationships. 
                                                                                                                                                 
entry by inducing retribution by powerful parties embracing ideologies different from that of the focal firm, or by influencing 
the bargaining power of the focal firm relative to other political parties. We discuss the impact of this type of political ties in 
detail when developing Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b.  
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In the context of political networks, the bargaining power of the focal firm derives 
from its stakes in the political ties, and the availability of alternative political ties. As 
indicated in Figure 1, the bargaining power of the focal firm relative to both the ruling 
party and the opposition party is likely become stronger when the distribution of political 
power gets dispersed. First, when the ruling party and the opposition party are equally 
powerful, the stakes of political parties increase as the competition between them for 
electoral campaigns contributions and votes intensifies. Each party engages in gaining 
support from connected firms, which is more critical for them to succeed in the intense 
party competition. Without the support from the business, political parties would be in 
inferior positions and may not be able to win elections. As a result, political parties 
become more dependent on their business partners, leading to their weaker bargaining 
position relative to the focal firm. In fact, it is found that under this situation, political 
parties are more willing to satisfy the demands of the focal firm so as to obtain its support 
which is critical to their winning in the election (Baron, 2001). In contrast, when the 
ruling party dominates political power, the stakes of political parties get lower primarily 
due to the fact that political parties are likely to request for fewer electoral resources from 
connected firms considering the great disparity in strength between the ruling party and 
the opposition party. To the extent that the superior access to information, resources, and 
favorable policies provided by political parties is always beneficial to the focal firm, the 
stake of the focal firm remain unchanged no matter how political power is distributed. 
Hence, the focal firm enjoys more bargaining power on the dimension of stakes in the 
political ties when political power is evenly distributed.  
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Second, when political power is distributed dispersedly, each party is able to 
provide some desirable resources, information, and public policies with the focal firm in 
exchange for its support. The focal firm enjoys more alternative political parties to pursue 
similar objectives. For instance, when the ruling party dominates politics, the focal firm 
may be forced to accept requests made by the ruling party if it wants to gain favorable 
policies. In contrast, when the opposition party controls the legislative branch, leaving 
only executive branch to the ruling party, the focal firm can resort to the opposition party 
to pursue similar or substitutable policies if the requirements put forwarded by the ruling 
party are not acceptable. The availability of more alternatives reduces the dependence of 
the focal firm on connected political parties and thus endows more bargaining power to 
the focal firm.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, we may draw the conclusion that, when the 
distribution of political power gets dispersed, the focal firm is likely to gain more 
bargaining power while the political parties tend to enjoy less bargaining power. 
Consequently, the focal firm will be in a stronger bargaining position relative to its 
political partners in negotiations. We briefly summarize how the bargaining power of 
each party in the political network changes in response to different distributions of 
political power in Table 5.1. 
********** Insert Table 5.1 about here ********** 
Portfolios of political ties maintained by firms have important implications for 
their market entries. They may facilitate entries into new markets by providing access to 
valuable information and resources not available through the arm-length relationships 
(e.g. trends of industrial policies), and favorable policies and treatments (e.g. entry 
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permits to regulated industries) with firms. However, they may also deter market entries 
when firms become victims of political struggles between political parties. Hence, to 
maximize the benefits drawn from portfolios of political ties while refraining themselves 
from retaliations imposed by powerful political parties, firms need to get connected to 
prominent parties, and leverage their bargaining power to derive desirable resources from 
them and at the same time to inhibit punitive tactics taken by political parties.  
In summary, our framework suggests that the value of portfolios of political ties 
derived by firms depends on the distribution of political power among political parties in 
the portfolios, which consequently determines the prominence of political parties and the 
interdependencies between firms and their political partners. Firms need to construct and 
adjust the configuration of portfolios of political ties in response to the changing political 
environment so as to enter into new markets. Figure 5.1 depicts our conceptual 
framework of how portfolios of political ties affect market entries by politically 
connected firms.  
********** Insert Figure 5.1 about here ********** 
The intense party competition and the concomitant changes in distribution of 
political power around 2000 in Taiwan provides a rare setting near natural experiment for 
us to examine the validity of our theoretical framework.  
 
PARTY COMPETITION IN TAIWAN FROM 1998-2004 
The KMT Nationalist Party dominated Taiwan’s politics and economy from its 
retreat from Mainland China in 1949 until 1987 (Gold, 1985; Wade, 1990), when the 
greatest wave of political democratization in Taiwan’s modern history took place (Tien, 
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1989). Martial law was lifted in 1987 and new political parties, labor protests and private 
mass media were allowed. The establishment of the major opposition party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) intensified the competition in political elections. 
Losing the monopolistic status in politics and facing severe challenges from DPP, KMT 
started seeking campaign contributions and votes from business groups. The relationship 
between business groups and KMT had turned from top-down to a more balanced 
strategic partnership. Before 2000, KMT had been the ruling party of Taiwan. It also 
controlled the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese equivalent of Congress, government 
agencies, and judiciary by assigning a large number of its party members to key positions.    
In the election for the 10th-term President of the Republic of China, Chen Shui-Bian 
from the DPP was elected president, putting an end to more than half a century of KMT 
rule in Taiwan. Chen Shui-Bian was re-elected in the 2004 presidential election. Since 
Taiwan adopts the presidential system, DPP’s success in presidential election did not 
guarantee its control of the Legislative Yuan. It turned out that KMT still possessed a 
majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan after DPP came into administrative power. 
The separation of legislative and executive authority in Taiwan induced intense 
competition and conflicts between KMT and DPP.   
Table 5.2A and Table 5.2B show the changes in distribution of political power 
among major political parties in Taiwan from 1998 to 2004. Table 5.2A is about the party 
competition in presidential elections. It shows that DPP won the presidency in both 2000 
and 2004. With regard to the legislative election, DPP won fewer seats than KMT in 
three consecutive elections took place in 1998 (31% vs. 55%), 2001 (39% vs. 51%), and 
2004 (40% vs. 50%) respectively. 
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********** Insert Table 5.2A and Table 5.2B about here ********** 
In summary, the political power in Taiwan was dominated by KMT before 2000, 
making opposition parties powerless and the power distribution highly uneven. This 
situation changed dramatically since DPP came into power in 2000. Political power was 
dispersed with DPP controlling the executive and KMT governing the legislative until 




Political ties and entry into new industries 
 Recent research indicates that being tied to powerful politicians greatly enhances 
the effectiveness of a firm’s non-market strategy such as lobbying and campaign 
contribution (Bonardi, Holburn, and Bergh, 2006). We argue that due to ruling party’s 
control of executive authority, political ties to leaders of the ruling party can facilitate 
firms’ entry into new industries by providing three substantive benefits. 
First, political ties to the ruling party enable firms to enjoy information advantage 
and acquire resources that are under ruling party’s control. The information transferred 
through political ties keeps firms updated about the changes in economic policies and 
regulations and helps them foresee changes in the policy environment (Schuler, Rehbein, 
and Cramer, 2002). Such information is particularly valuable in emerging economies 
where information asymmetry is prevalent (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), and policies and 
regulations change constantly (Keister, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1999). Moreover, 
when the ruling party has discretion over how policies and regulations are interpreted and 
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implemented based on its political ideology (Kalt and Zupan, 1984) and the preferences 
of relevant voter constituents that affect its electoral success (Vanden Bergh and de 
Figueiredo, 2003), the information obtained from political ties with the ruling party is 
richer and more accurate than that acquired from other sources (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; 
Potter, 2002; Li and Zhang, 2007). The information advantage help politically connected 
firms envisage future directions of economic growth (Chu, 1994), detect industrial 
policies in advance (Fields, 1997) and identify novel market opportunities (Luo, 2003). 
Ties to the ruling party may also provide groups with access to resources that are crucial 
to their expansion into new industries. For example, when the banking sector of Taiwan 
opened up for private firms in early 1990’s, the Ministry of Finance set the minimum 
capital requirement for the establishment of a new bank at NT$10 billion (equivalent to 
US$375 million). Consequently, all the 15 newly-established banks in 1991 were backed 
by large business groups, 79% of which were politically connected to KMT, which 
provided financial support with the business groups through state banks (Chu and Hung, 
2002; Chung, 2004).  
Second, firms tied to the ruling party may have superior access to licenses, 
permits, administrative privileges, privileged regulatory treatments, and favors, which 
makes their market entry easier. Ruling party members often use their power in public 
policy making to steer preferential treatments toward firms with which they have political 
ties. For example, in our research context, KMT bureaucrats favored 6 
telecommunication firms co-invested by 20 largest business groups in their bid to acquire 
8 wireless telecommunication licenses in 1997 because of their social ties with the top 
management teams of these firms (Wealth Magazine, 1998). In Columbia, political ties 
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were found critical for businesses to obtain contracts and licenses, which in turn provide 
firms with opportunities to enter new markets (Rettberg, 2001). Kock and Guillén (2001) 
suggest that “contact capability”, which is the ability of firms to link to domestic 
regulators for resources and permits, as well as to foreign providers of technology and 
markets, enables business groups to expand into unrelated industries.   
Third, political ties to the ruling party promote the legitimacy of firms. 
Institutional theorists have found that when a firm develops ties to organizations with 
high legitimacy, it obtains enhanced legitimacy and status because the ties imply its 
conformance to taken-for-granted institutional prescriptions (Baum and Oliver, 1991; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Oliver, 1991). The enhanced legitimacy 
in turn facilitates the firm in its attempts to acquire important resources for survival and 
effectiveness (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Rao, 1994). For 
example, Peng and his colleagues (2005) argued that network ties to dominant 
institutions confer useful resources and legitimacy that are critical to business group 
diversification. Baum and Oliver (1991) demonstrated that firms with linkages to 
government agencies and regulatory commissions had a survival advantage conferred by 
its increased legitimacy and enhanced ability to acquire resources. Since the ruling party 
is an organization with high legitimacy in the fields of business and economic matters, 
business groups tied to the ruling party are likely to enjoy increased legitimacy, which 
facilitates resource acquisition and confirms its rights and competence to provide new 
products and services.  
When the ruling party simultaneously controls the executive and legislative 
branch, political ties with the ruling party are even more beneficial. Taking advantage of 
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its overwhelming political power, the ruling party is able to provide a larger pool of 
resources and information that connected business groups can tap on. Without 
disturbance from opposition parties in the legislation process, the ruling party is more 
able to endow favorable treatments and privileges to connected business groups by 
proposing and passing laws, rules, and regulations. In addition, the legitimacy of the 
ruling party is likely to be higher when it has both executive and legislative authority. 
Business groups connected to the ruling party hence enjoy higher legitimacy and thus an 
extra boost to their market entries. Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: The more political ties to the ruling political party, the more 
entries into unrelated industries by business groups in emerging economies.  
Political ties with the opposition party which has legislative authority are also 
conducive to market entries by firms. Legislators affiliated to the opposition party may 
offer bills favorable to the connected firms (Shaffer, 1995). They may also modify 
existing rules and regulations to improve the competitive position of connected firms by 
disproportionately raising the costs of their rivals, lower or get rid of entry barriers to 
connected firms, and indirectly steer resources in the direction of connected firms 
through regulations on banks and other institutions (Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman, 2006; 
Siegel, 2004). Entry into the petroleum industry of Taiwan by Ho Tung Group in 2001 
demonstrates the benefits of such political ties. Before 2001, the petroleum industry was 
monopolized by two large petrochemical corporations due to their ability to meet the 
requirement of daily oil-refining volume specified in the Petroleum Management Law. 
To get into this profitable industry, a small-scale chemical business group, Ho Tung, 
utilized its political ties with KMT legislators to reduce the required daily oil-refining 
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volume and successfully entered into this industry (Wealth Magazine, 2001). In addition 
to taking advantage of the power of the opposition party over legislation, connect firms 
are also likely to enjoy enhanced legitimacy to the extent that the dominant party at the 
legislature is regarded as a highly legitimate organization. We thus hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: The more political ties to the opposition party with legislative 
authority, the more entries into unrelated industries by business groups in 
emerging economies. 
In contrast, being connected to an opposition party which has little political power 
may impede the expansion of business groups into unrelated industries. Opposition 
parties which do not have control of the legislature are unable to provide business groups 
with resources and information that facilitate entries into new markets because they do 
not have the power to set laws and regulations, to influence public policy making through 
passage or veto of statutes, and to steer resources in the direction to connected business 
groups.  
Instead, being tied to powerless opposition parties may induce discrimination and 
retribution by the ruling party, leading the connected groups to be victims of political 
rivalry. From the perspective of the ruling party, groups connected to opposition parties 
are discontent or even objective to its rule.  To reinforce its governance, the ruling party 
often takes retaliatory actions to undermine the growth of business groups connected to 
opposition parties. Empirical studies show that firms connected to political enemies of 
those in power are less able to form cross-border strategic alliances with foreign firms 
which possess advanced technological and managerial know-how because of the resource 
exclusion and discrimination imposed by politicians in power (Siegel, 2007). The Chi-
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Mei Group in Taiwan is a well-know adherent to DPP since KMT dominated the politics 
of Taiwan in 1949. In the early stage of its development, Chi-Mei Group suffered from 
the short of capital because the state banks controlled by KMT either rarely provided 
bank credits to it or offered loans on unfavorable terms (Ju, 2003). 
Moreover, the legitimacy of business groups may be damaged if they are 
connected to opposition parties without political power because such parties suffer from 
lower level of political popularity. The impaired legitimacy of connected groups is likely 
to hurt their ability to maintain steady resource flows from external environment (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Cattani, Ferriani, Negro, and Perretti, 2008). It is difficult for them to 
exploit the “contact capability” of combining the local market and supply of resources 
with foreign technology in new industries (Kock and Guillén, 2001). In line with this 
discussion, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The more political ties to the opposition political party without 
political power, the fewer entries into unrelated industries by business groups in 
emerging economies.  
Diversity of portfolios of political ties and entry into unrelated industries 
 A diverse portfolio of political ties induces both benefits and costs to business 
groups’ entry into unrelated industries. Business groups may benefit from ties to multiple 
political parties by having access to diverse resource pools and information that are 
applicable to a number of unrelated industries. Moreover, a diverse portfolio of political 
ties protects the group from political risk resulting from unexpected regime changes. 
When business leaders befriend politicians of different parties, the connected group is 
less likely to be negatively targeted by the new ruling party, whose key members have 
 115
social ties with the group. As such, the connected group is able to maintain a relatively 
stable flow of benefits derived from its portfolio of political ties regardless of the 
outcomes of party competition. Diverse political ties enhance the political flexibility of 
the focal group.  
A case in point is Formosa Plastic, one of Taiwan’s largest business groups. It 
used to keep connections with KMT, but it gradually diversified its political ties by 
befriending DPP leaders with the rise of DPP. Wang Yung-Ching, the founder of 
Formosa Plastic, often accepted dinner invitations from the Chairman of DPP, Chen 
Shui-Bian when KMT was still in power (Wealth Magazine, 2002). After DPP came into 
power in 2000, Formosa Plastic continued to operate smoothly, successfully avoiding the 
adverse impacts of regime change. By contrast, maintaining good relations with only one 
political party may hurt the connected group by reducing its political flexibility. 
Empirical and anecdotal evidence has indicated that being loyal to the ruling party may 
make firms victims of discrimination and retribution by an opposition party that comes 
into power (Byun, 2004; Siegel, 2007). Due to the KMT’s political dominance in Taiwan 
for over half a century, many business groups were over-embedded with KMT. Taiwan 
Cement, one of the largest business groups in Taiwan, was closely tied to KMT by 
having its founder Koo Chen-Fu serving as a member of KMT Central Standing 
Committee from 1982 to mid-1990s and playing golf with the 4th KMT president of 
Taiwan, Lee Teng-Hui since 1992. After DPP came into power in 2000, however, its net 
income dropped from 38th in 1999 to 51st in 2001. The number of industries it entered 
dropped from 8 in 1998 to 0 in 2004 and anecdotal evidence indicates that this maybe due 
to the lack of financial support from the DPP government (Wealth Magazine, 2004).  
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However, there are also disadvantages of maintaining a diverse portfolio of 
political ties. First, business groups have to bear relatively higher maintenance costs in 
the form of campaign contributions, joint investment with party-run businesses, gifts and 
banquets (Yang, 1994). Second, being friendly to all the political parties may reduce the 
level of trust obtained from each party, making political ties less effective in acquiring 
scarce and valuable resources and tacit information. It also signals the disloyalty of the 
group to each political party, which may induce discrimination and retribution by 
powerful political parties.  
We argue that the net effect on market entry by the focal group is contingent on 
the distribution of political power among the rival political parties. Specifically, when 
political power is dominated by the ruling party which has control of both executive and 
legislative authority, the other political parties have little political maneuver. To the 
extent that the benefits accessible through political ties is a function of the prominence of 
connected political parties (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Gabbay and Leenders, 1999; Lin, 
1999), the political ties to powerless opposition parties are redundant to the focal group 
as they do not provide resources and information conducive to the expansion of business 
scope. The potential benefits of tapping into the diverse resource profiles of different 
political parties by maintaining a diverse portfolio of political ties can hardly be realized.  
Moreover, the relative bargaining power of the focal group tends to be weak when 
political power is disproportionately concentrated on the ruling party. The ruling party 
does not face challenges from the powerless opposition parties and it has tight control 
over economic resources and the competitive environment (Bonardi, Holburn and Bergh, 
2006). The focal group has to depend on the ruling party to a great extent so as to 
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construct a favorable external environment, while the ruling party depends less on the 
group for its support in elections as it already possess an advantageous position in party 
competition. The weak bargaining power of the focal group not only undermines its 
ability to acquire resources and information, but also makes it easily become the target of 
retribution by the ruling party, making its entry into new industries difficult. 
In addition, when the ruling party has dominant political power, the chance of 
unexpected change in political regime are relatively small because the ruling party is able 
to reinforce its rule by obtaining electoral advantages and suppressing opponents with its 
political power. As a result, the value of political flexibility by maintaining a diverse 
portfolio of political ties is greatly depreciated. Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 4a: The more diverse political ties to political parties, the fewer 
entries into unrelated industries by business groups in emerging economies when 
the ruling party has dominant political power.  
When political parties are equally powerful, a diverse portfolio of political ties 
facilitates market entry of the connected group. Since each political party controls either 
administrative agency or legislative branch and thus has certain resources, information 
and privileged treatments to allocate, getting connected to multiple political parties 
provides business groups with opportunities to exploit diverse and abundant benefits 
from its political partners. Moreover, party competition is likely to intensify when 
political parties are evenly matched in political power. The intense political competition 
drives political parties to rely on business groups for campaign contributions, votes and 
information (Mueller, 2003). Consequently, business groups enjoy stronger bargaining 
power which makes politicians more willing to “trade” policy favors, valuable resources, 
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and information for support in elections (Baron, 2001). Business groups connected to 
distinct political parties can thus expand into unrelated industries easily by taking 
advantage of their diverse resources and non-redundant information.  
When political parties are evenly powerful, the chance of political regime change 
is great. The benefit of obtaining political flexibility by maintaining good relations with 
rival parties becomes significant. Political flexibility ensures security of access to critical 
resources and information no matter which party comes into power. This is particularly 
important for the expansion into unrelated industries which usually requires large amount 
of investment and stable flows of complementary assets (Siegfried and Evans, 1994).  
Additionally, when political power is evenly distributed, groups with a diverse 
portfolio of political ties are not likely to be discriminated or retaliated by political parties 
because of their stronger relative bargaining power. Equally powerful parties competing 
with each other for support from business groups are less motivated to impose punitive 
measures against groups which keep connections with their political enemies.  
Accordingly, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4b: The more diverse the political ties to political parties with 
political power, the more entries into unrelated industries by business groups in 
emerging economies when the political power is evenly distributed between the 
ruling party and one of the opposition parties. 
Contingencies imposed by group debt ratio and group experience of market entry 
After articulating the overarching relationship between diversity of portfolios of 
political ties and the entry activities of connected business groups, we argue that such 
relationship is likely to vary across business groups with different internal resource 
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profiles. To enter new markets, business groups need to employ a large amount of 
resources, including both internally accumulated ones and externally derived ones from 
political ties. As groups are endowed with distinct internal resource profiles, their 
dependence on political ties to acquire resources for market entry is likely to differ from 
each other. Thus, we expect the effects of portfolios of political ties on market entry to 
vary across business groups with distinct internal resource endowments24.  Specifically, 
we examine how groups with different levels of debt ratio and experience of market entry 
are influenced by their political ties when entering into new markets. These contingent 
factors each exert their effects by either enhancing the benefits of diversity and flexibility 
or exacerbating the costs of retribution. 
Debt ratio as a contingency 
Debt ratio of a business group indicates its dependence on external financial 
resources (Baker, 1990; Pfeffer, 1987). Highly-leveraged groups are more dependent on 
external financial resources relative to counterparts with low debt ratios. Existing 
literature has demonstrated that political ties serve as an important channel for firms to 
acquire financial resources. Faccio (2006) finds that politically connected firms have 
easier access to debt financing and enjoy lower taxation. Khwaja and Mian (2004) find 
that politically linked firms borrowed twice as much as non-connected firms from public 
banks in Pakistan. Johnson and Mitton (2003) shows that connections to politicians in 
power serve as critical conduits for government subsidies in Malaysia. Therefore, 
political ties to the political parties which control financial resources are more valuable to 
highly leveraged groups than to groups with low debt ratio.   
                                                 
24 The contingent effects of internal resources may also be applicable to dyadic political ties examined in H1-H3. 
However, we focus on portfolios of political ties instead because our major interest is to explore how political ties as an 
external source of resources may affect market entry jointly with internal resources possessed by business groups.  
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The ruling party controls the government and thus has power to allocate financial 
resources by using its influence on government-owned banks. It is found that 42% of the 
total assets of the 10 largest banks in 92 countries are controlled by the government-
controlled banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002). Since banks operate 
across the whole economy rather than in a defined industry, politicians of the ruling party 
have great opportunities to channel funds to favored firms so as to maintain and increase 
their political power (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Dinç (2005) shows that, in both 
emerging and developed economies, government-owned banks increase their lending in 
election years as compared to private banks so as to obtain votes from the business. It 
was reported that the DPP President of Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian, provided large amounts 
of preferential loans through government-controlled financial institutions to firms which 
supported him in the Presidential Election in 2000 (Wealth Magazine, 2003). The 
opposition party with legislative authority may also indirectly provide financial resources 
with connected firms by favorably altering regulations regarding raising funds through 
bank loans, stock issuance, and venture capital.  
When the ruling party has dominant political power, its politicians are likely to 
reward allies and punish opponents by providing bank credits with groups connected only 
to it but not those tied to both the ruling party and opposition parties. Opposition parties 
are not able to provide financial resources due to the lack of political power. As a result, a 
diverse portfolio of political ties negatively affects the expansion of businesses scope. 
However, this negative effect tends to be greater for groups with higher debt ratio 
because they need the financial resources more urgently than those with low debt ratio to 
move into the new markets. Without the financial support by the government-controlled 
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banks, they are unlikely to raise sufficient capital for expansion.  
When political parties are evenly matched in political power, groups with 
connections to multiple parties have opportunities to tap on multiple sources of capital. 
Moreover, due to their high dependence on the groups, both the ruling party and 
opposition parties are unlikely to exclude groups tied to their political enemies from the 
list of financing. Hence, a diverse portfolio of political ties has a positive effect on the 
market expansion of business groups. Groups with higher debt ratios are likely to benefit 
more from the diverse political ties because the diverse and abundant financial resources 
acquired through these ties relax its resource constraints and enable them to make 
investments in more unrelated industries. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the debt ratio of business groups, the stronger the 
hypothesized relationships in H4a and H4b will be. 
Experience of market entry as a contingency 
Experience of market entry is a valuable resource which enables business groups 
to be less dependent on political ties to obtain information and resources for expansion. 
Since market entry is a learning-by-doing process (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Amsden 
and Hikino, 1994), groups with rich experience of market entry are likely to develop a 
superior capability of detecting the trend of economic growth and industrial development, 
understanding economic policies and regulations, and thus identifying market 
opportunities timely.  Moreover, compared to those with focused business portfolios, 
experienced groups in market entry tend to have multiple external sources to acquire 
various resources supportive to entries into new markets. It is found that diversified 
Indian business groups form strategic alliances with foreign providers of technology and 
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finance more easily than single-business firms mainly due to their good reputation for 
honesty and reliability (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Diversified Taiwanese business 
groups, such as Formosa Plastics and Ta Tung, established systematically more external 
linkages with foreign companies and venture capitalists than less diversified counterparts 
(Sheng, 2003). Taking advantage of their long-established relationships with suppliers, 
customers, investors, and foreign partners, groups undertaking market entries frequently 
may enjoy diverse and abundant resources derived externally. In addition, to the extent 
that business groups in emerging economies often enter into new industries by applying 
imported foreign technologies and managerial skills to local market (Hikino and Amsden, 
1994; Kock and Guillén, 2001), groups which expand frequently are able to unpack and 
assimilate foreign technologies and management expertise efficiently, and thus enjoy 
advantageous competitive positions and more opportunities to penetrate into new markets.  
When the ruling party dominates political power, groups experienced in market 
entry may be hurt less than less experienced ones by maintaining a diverse portfolio of 
political ties. To the extent that experienced groups are equipped with a superior 
capability in identifying, collecting and integrating resources from various origins, the 
discrimination and retaliation imposed by the ruling party are less likely to impede the 
groups to expand their business scope. These groups are still able to expand by resorting 
to their ability to identify market opportunities, internalize advanced foreign knowledge, 
and pool resources from diverse conduits.  
By the same token, when political power is distributed evenly, experienced 
groups are likely to benefit less from their diverse political ties mainly due to their access 
to heterogeneous information and resources through various channels. Moreover, the 
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political flexibility derived from a diverse portfolio of political ties tends to be less 
valuable to experienced groups as they can still successfully enter new markets by taking 
advantage of their superior capability in establishing and managing new plants even if 
they are negatively targeted by any political party after political regime changes. In line 
with discussions above, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: The more experience of market entry business groups have, the 
weaker the hypothesized relationships in H4a and H4b will be. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Data source and sample 
The empirical analysis is based on the data of the largest 250 business groups in 
Taiwan in two periods: 1998-2000 and 2004-2006. Since the DPP won the presidency 
and replaced KMT as the ruling party in 2000, we collect information about political ties 
in 1998 and 2004 to capture the distinct rivalry situations where the ruling party and the 
opposition party switched places. We further explain the market entry activities of 
business groups during 1998-2000 and 2004-2006 based on their political ties established 
by 1998 and 2004 respectively.  
The major data source of entry activities by business group is the Business Groups in 
Taiwan (BGT) directory, compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in 
Taipei. CCIS is the oldest and most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and an 
affiliate of Standard & Poor’s in the United States. The BGT directory collects 
information on the top 250 groups in sales and is confined to groups whose principal 
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firms are registered in Taiwan25. CCIS defines a business group as “a coherent business 
organization including several independent enterprises.” Since its second edition (which 
was published in 1974), BGT has consistently maintained the following criteria in its 
selection of business groups: (1) more than 51 percent of the ownership must be native 
capital; (2) the group must have three or more independent firms; (3) the group must have 
more than NT$5 billion in total sales26 and (4) the core firm of the group must be 
registered in Taiwan. This directory is the most comprehensive and reliable source for 
business groups in Taiwan. Several previous studies rely on this source (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2005).  
For each business group, the directory provides information about its top management, 
size, history and financial performance. For each member firm, it provides information 
about its line of business, based on which we identify its industry. Since there is no 
ready-to-use industry coding in the BGT directory, we assigned the firm a two-digit 
industrial code following the 2000 version of the Standard Industrial Classification 
published by the Taiwanese government. After aggregating the industry information of 
all member firms to the group level, we compared the industrial profile of the group 
between t and t+1. We considered industries with different 2-digit SIC codes to be 
unrelated industries. Groups entered unrelated industries if distinct 2-digit industries 
which were not present at t appeared at t+1 in their business portfolios.  
To track the entry activities of the largest 250 business groups, we collected 
information on their industrial portfolio every two years (i.e. 1998-2000 and 2004-2006). 
The two-year window spans a moderate time period which is likely to capture entries into 
                                                 
25 The number of business groups included in the BGT directory differs slightly across years. It collects information 
about the largest 180 business groups in 1998 and 250 business groups in 2004 respectively.  
26 This number changes over years as business groups become bigger. 
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unrelated industries. To track the change of industrial portfolio over time, we only 
included groups which were present in two consecutive issues of the BGT directory. The 
sample of 1998 consists of 167 observations and the sample of 2004 contains 227 
observations.  
According to social structure and the principles of how political ties operate in 
Taiwan (Hsu, 1991), we used different methods to collect two different types of political 
ties: formal position interlocks and informal ties. For the formal position interlocks, we 
collected data on key position holders in both business groups and the political circle. We 
then cross-checked the names of business groups with the names in the major political 
institutions to identify position interlocks. With regard to informal political ties, we focus 
on family and social relationships between group executives and prominent political 
figures. Specifically, we coded three major types of informal ties: 1) familial and marital 
ties, 2) close friendships and same-hometown relationships, and 3) trade associations and 
social club memberships. After combining formal and informal political ties, we came up 
with the political ties with each political party by referring to the party affiliation of 
connected political actors. The specific data sources and coding schemes used to measure 
political ties are discussed in Appendix 1.  
Compared to the measure of political ties in prior research, our approach of 
measurement is an improvement in two aspects. First, instead of adopting indirect 
approaches by using subject ratings, indexes and reports collected by other agencies (e.g. 
Fisman, 2001; Bertrand, et al., 2004), this paper uses a more direct approach that locates 
specific ties between business executives and politicians. Second, almost all existing 
studies have adopted synchronized research designs, examining political ties and firm 
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strategy within the same period. We collected data of political ties for two time periods 
(1998 and 2004), enabling us to identify the role of political ties at different levels of 
rivalry between connected political parties and address the issue of reverse causality. In 
addition, we referred to the Largest Corporations in Taiwan by CCIS to collect the sales 
and ROA at industry level.  
Table 5.3A shows the characteristics of Taiwanese business groups in our sample. 
There are 167 groups in the 1998 sample and 227 groups in the 2004 sample. The total 
number of group-year observations is 394. Among the sample groups in 1998, 62% are 
politically connected. In the sample of 2004, however, only 45% of the groups were 
embedded in political networks. With regard to the size of sample groups, the number of 
group affiliates increased over time, rising from 11 affiliates in 1998 to 34 affiliates in 
2004.  
********** Table 5.3A about here ********** 
Dependent variable: Entry into new industries 
To test the proposed relationships between political ties and entry activities, we 
counted the number of entries into new 2-digit SIC in a 2-year span (1998-2000, 2004-
2006).  
Independent variables 
We use the number of ties between a group and the political parties as the measure of 
political ties (including both formal and informal political ties). We distinguish between 
ties with KMT and ties with DPP. Moreover, we measure the diversity of portfolios of 









where D is the diversity measure and P is the percentage of political ties with KMT or 
DPP. This index ranges from 0 to 1. The closer it is to 1, the more diverse the portfolio of 
political ties.  
Control variables 
Following previous studies (Chang, 1996; Khanna and Palepu, 2000), we controlled 
for a set of group characteristics that may also affect the entry activities of the group: 
group size, group age, group profitability, group debt ratio, group diversification, group 
experience of market entry and group main industry. Group Size is measured by logged 
total group assets, adjusted by the 2000 consumer price index (Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, 2000: 179). Group age is the number of years since the first member firm of a 
group was established. Group ROA refers to the annual group return on assets. Debt ratio 
is the ratio of liability to total assets of the group. Group diversification has been found to 
enhance group performance by promoting economies of scope (Amsden and Hikino, 
1994; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). We use the following formula to measure it: 
),/1ln( jj PP ×∑ where jP is defined as the percentage of group sales in industry sector j 
(Palepu, 1985). The identification of industry sector is based on 4-digit product categories 
defined in the Standard Industrial Classification published by the Taiwanese government 
in 2000. Experience of market entry is measured as the stock of market entries conducted 
by the group since 1990, which was the onset of large-scale economic liberalization in 
Taiwan. Since the value of previous experience depreciates as market conditions change, 
we used a 20% depreciation rate to calculate the stock of market entries over time. We 
also controlled for the main industry of the group across 12 industries27. The industry 
                                                 
27 These industries are agriculture, food, textile, wood, chemical, non-metallic, metals, machinery, electrical/electronic, 
construction, real estate and financial services and retail.  
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with the largest proportion of group sales was coded as the major business line28. To the 
extent that the entry and exit activities are correlated to each other29 (Chang, 1996; Chung 
and Luo, 2008), we controlled for the number of exits from incumbent 2-digit SIC 
industries. We also controlled for the total number of political ties (the sum of KMT ties 
and DPP ties) when examining the effects of the diversity of political ties.  
Additionally, to the extent that industry attractiveness is critical to explain firms’ 
entry into certain markets rather than others (Porter, 1980), we created two industry-level 
variables to capture the influence of industry attractiveness on market entry. Industry 
Profitability is the aggregation of the ROA of industries that business groups entered 
weighted by the percentage of group sales in the entered industries. Industry Sales, which 
indicates the industry attractiveness in terms of volumes of sales, is measured as 
aggregate sales in industries that groups entered, weighted by the percentage of group 
sales in the entered industries. 
Model specification 
We use the following baseline specification to test the relation between political ties 
and entry into new industries by business groups: 
Entries into new industries = β + β1 (a vector of political tie variables) + β2 (a 
vector of group internal resources variables) + β3 (political tie variables*group 




                                                 
28 On average, the major business line contributed 67% of group sales.  
29 For example, business groups may exit less profitable industries and enter promising ones. 
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Table 5.3B reports summary statistics of variables included in the analysis. It shows 
that there is significant variance in the entry activities of business groups as well as their 
political ties with KMT and DPP. The mean of diversity of political ties is 0.10, implying 
that the majority of sample groups maintains political ties with only one political party 
Indeed, out of the 103 politically connected business groups in our sample, 90 groups 
were connected only to KMT and none of them maintained ties only to DPP as of 1998. 
In 2004, among the 103 business groups with political ties, 36 groups were tied solely to 
KMT and 16 groups were connected only to DPP. Table 5.4A to Table 5.4C report the 
correlation matrix of variables in 1998, 2004 and the combined two years respectively.  
********** Table 5.3B, Table 5.4A-5.4C about here ********** 
Regression results 
We used the negative binomial model to test the empirical implications. The negative 
binomial model is appropriate for analyzing count data when over-dispersion of the 
conditional mean and variance functions violates the assumptions of Poisson regression 
(Greene, 1993).  
Table 5.5 reports the pooled regression results of the effect of political ties on 
business groups’ entry into new industries. The left-half of the table shows the results in 
1998 and the right-half of the table indicates the results in 2004. Model 1 and Model 7 
contain only control variables, serving as baseline models. The inclusion of the two 
variables for political ties in Model 2 and Model 8 improves the overall model fit over the 
baseline models (d.f.=2, P<0.01for Model 2 and P<0.05 for Model 8). In Model 3 and 
Model 9, we added in the diversity of political ties while controlling for the total number 
of political ties. In Model 4 and Model 10, the addition of the interaction term between 
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diversity of political ties and debt ratio improves the overall fit compared to Model 3 and 
Model 9 respectively (d.f. =1, P<0.01). Similarly, including the interaction term between 
diversity of political ties and experience of market entry in Model 5 and Model 11 
improves the model fit relative to Model 3 (d.f. =1, P<0.01) and Model 9 (d.f.=1, P<0.05) 
respectively. Model 6, which is a fully specified model, also shows enhanced overall fit 
compared to Model 4 (d.f.=1, P<0.05) and Model 5 (d.f.=1, P<0.05). Similar result 
regarding Model 12 is found when it is compared with Model 10 (d.f.=1, P<0.05) and 
Model 11(d.f.=1, P<0.01).   
Hypothesis 1 predicts that political ties with the ruling party will facilitate business 
groups’ entry into new industries. The results in Model 2 show that the coefficient of 
political ties with KMT in 1998 displays the expected positive trend and is statistically 
significant (P<0.01). Similarly, as shown in Model 8, the coefficient of political ties with 
DPP in 2004 is also positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent with 
the prediction in Hypothesis 1. In a negative binomial regression, a unit change in an 
independent variable X leads to changes in the expected count, Y, by a factor of exp(β), 
holding other variables constant. As shown in Model 2, an increase of one political tie to 
KMT is related to a 1.5% increase in the number of unrelated industries entered in 1998 
(β=0.015, [exp(0.015)*1-1] =0.015). One more political tie to DPP is associated with a 
12.5% increase in the entry into unrelated industries in 2004.  
Hypothesis 2 proposes that political ties with the opposition party with legislative 
authority promote market entry. In Model 8, the coefficient of KMT tie is positive, but 
not statistically significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Hypothesis 3 predicts 
that political ties with opposition parties which do not have any political power will 
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impede the entry activities of business groups. Consistent with our expectation, political 
ties with DPP in Model 2 are negatively related to groups’ entry into unrelated industries 
(P<0.05). One more DPP tie is related to a 22% decrease in the number of unrelated 
industries entered in 1998.  
Model 3 and Model 9 test the impact of a diverse portfolio of political ties on entries. The 
results show that diverse political ties had a negative effect in 1998 (P<0.05), but had a 
positive effect on group expansion in 2004 (P<0.01). Hence, Hypothesis 4a and 
Hypothesis 4b, which predict the contingent effects of diverse portfolios of political ties, 
are supported. One standard deviation of increase in diversity of political tie is associated 
with a 29% decrease in the number of entries into unrelated industries in 1998 and a 27% 
increase in the number of unrelated industries entered in 2004. 
  In Model 4 and Model 10, we added the interaction term between diversity of 
political ties and group debt ratio to test H5, which posited a reinforced relationship 
between political ties and group entries. The expected negative trend (P<0.01) of the 
interaction term in Model 4 and the positive trend (P<0.01) of the interaction term in 
Model 10 show that groups with high debt ratio were hurt more by diverse political ties in 
1998 and benefited more from them in 2004, supporting Hypothesis 5. Specifically, for 
groups with diversity of political tie at mean level (0.10), one standard deviation increase 
in debt ratio is related to a 29% decrease in the number of unrelated industries entered in 
1998 and a 37% increase in the number of entries into unrelated industries in 2004.  
To test Hypothesis 6, we introduced the interaction term between diversity of 
political tie and experience of market entry in Model 5 and Model 11 respectively. We 
found that the interaction term displayed a positive trend and was statistically significant 
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(P<0.05) in 1998. It showed a negative trend and was statistically significant (P<0.10) in 
2004. This is consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 6, which indicates that groups 
experienced in market entry suffer less from diverse political ties when the ruling party 
has dominant political power and benefit less from diverse political ties when the 
political parties are evenly matched in political power. Moreover, for groups with average 
level of diversity of political tie (0.1), one standard deviation increase in experience of 
market entry is associated with a 13% increase in the number of entries into unrelated 
industries in 1998 and a 3% decrease in the number of unrelated industries entered in 
2004. The forgoing findings about proposed hypotheses stay in the fully specified Model 
6 and Model 12.  
********** Table 5.5 about here ********** 
Checks for reverse causality 
The evidence we get so far shows a strong association between political ties and 
business groups’ expansion into new industries. However, this result should be 
interpreted with caution because it is possible that entry into new industries leads to the 
establishment of political tie. For instance, politicians may prefer to partner with 
diversified business groups which are more likely to provide votes and campaign 
contributions due to their large scope of production. In the meantime, the more 
diversified a business group, the higher the probability for the group to interact with 
politicians in different settings. To address this causality issue, we compared the 
emergence of political ties to groups’ entry into new industries and observed that the 
personal relationships between business leaders and political actors in our dataset largely 
predate the expansion of connected business groups.  
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Moreover, we tested the causality issue directly by running a set of regressions 
using the change of various types of political ties between 1998 and 2004 as dependent 
variable, and the number of entered industries in 1998 as independent variable. The 
control variables remained the same. The regression results show that the coefficient of 
number of entries in all the models is not significant. Hence, it can be concluded that 
entries into new industries by business groups are not associated with the change of 
political ties possessed by group leaders. 
Robustness check 
 As the sample groups in 1998 and 2004 are not exactly the same, our results may 
be driven by some unobserved group characteristics rather than simply portfolios of 
political ties. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the composition of groups in 
the two different periods, we examined the entry activities of a subset of business groups 
that appeared in both 1998 and 2004 (208 groups) with the same models in Table 5.5. 
The results of such analysis are qualitatively the same as those based on the entire sample.  
 
  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study is motivated by the lack of research on the interplay between business and 
political parties, an agenda that becomes particularly salient when the political 
environment of firms is affected by the competition or rivalry between two or more 
political parties. Under such circumstances, firms need to consider with which parties 
they should maintain congenial relationships, which have significant implications for 
firm strategy such as new market entry. Instead of looking at dyadic, independent ties, we 
focus on the portfolio of political ties, which depicts interactions between a firm and 
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political parties and captures the overall impact of political ties on its market entry. Using 
Taiwanese business groups as a research context, we develop a contingent theory of the 
effect of political ties on the entry into unrelated industries. By differentiating political 
parties in their political power, we depict the prominence of partners in the political 
networks of business groups and investigate the differential effects of each type of 
partners on the focal business groups. Furthermore, we identify a set of contingencies that 
highlight the underlying mechanisms of resource provision, political flexibility, and 
retribution through which a portfolio of political ties exerts its effects. Our results show 
that political ties affect market entry by business groups both individually and in 
combination. Consistent with findings in the network literature (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; 
Stuart, 2000; Stuart, et al., 1999; Zaheer and Bell, 2005), ties to prominent political 
parties are facilitative to market entry, while those with powerless parties are detrimental. 
Moreover, the effect of a diverse portfolio of political ties on market entry by business 
groups depends on distribution of political power among political parties, and the 
interdependence between groups and connected political parties. Further, internal 
resources of groups, such as debt ratio and experience of market entry, moderate the 
effects of political ties portfolios. This study contributes to the literature on corporate 
political strategy, on portfolio of network ties, on market entry, and on the organization 
of government. 
This study advances the literature of corporate political strategy by examining the 
political strategy firms should adopt to interact with political parties. Basically, in a 
pluralistic political system, when firms select political parties to be connected with, they 
need to take into consideration the competition between political parties. The results of 
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competition for presidency and legislative seats determine the distribution of political 
power, and thus the resources controlled by political parties, as well as their dependence 
on firms. In particular, firms should get connected to the ruling party and avoid 
relationships with opposition parties without political power. Regarding ties to the 
opposition party with legislative authority, we did not find the expected positive effect on 
market entry. Considering the fact that it usually takes long time for the favorable laws, 
rules, and regulations to be approved and take effect, our two-year window may not 
effectively capture the impact of such ties. Moreover, when the competition is intense, 
firms benefit from a diverse portfolio of political ties. When the ruling party has absolute 
advantage in the political competition, firms tied solely to the ruling party have 
advantages against those with diverse political partners. Additionally, it is found that 
political ties are not equally important to firms. Instead, the efficacy of political ties 
varies depending on the internal resource profile of the connected firm. Adopting the 
right political strategy to interact with political parties is more important for firms with 
high debt ratio and scant experience of market entry. These findings are consistent with 
the contingent perspective of political capital (Peng and Luo, 2000) and further improve 
our understanding of the contingency factors.   
This study also sheds light on the literature on portfolio of network ties by 
investigating how the rivalry between alters affects outcomes of the focal firm in the 
context of political networks. Prior studies in the context of alliance portfolio showed 
positive effects of alter competition on firm performance (Lavie, 2007). However, we 
find that rivalry between alters does not necessarily benefit the focal firm when alters 
have punitive power over the focal firm. The brokerage benefits derived by the focal firm 
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from alter competition may be offset by the retribution imposed by alters. The contrast of 
the different findings suggests that the impact of rivalry between alters on the focal firm 
is contingent on the nature of relationships between the focal firm and its alters.  
Our results also hold important implications for the literature about entry 
activities by multi-business firms. Entry into new industries is a major corporate strategic 
activity with important implications for the growth of firms because it involves creation 
of new markets and alters the allocation of available resources among business lines 
(Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991). Existing literature on the entry activities of firms 
mainly focuses on how surplus internal resources drive firms to move into new product 
markets and shows that firms are likely to enter markets which require resources similar 
to firms’ existing resources (Chang, 1996; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Although these 
streams of research significantly contribute to understanding market entry, the overlook 
of external factors such as ties to the dominant political power is unfortunate because 
these factors often influence the resource profile and external competitive environment of 
firms (Fisman, 2001; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Peng 
and Luo, 2000).  
This study bridges the corporate political strategy and market entry research by 
highlighting the contingent role of political ties in market entry. It shows that a firm’s 
linkages to political organizations play an important role in affecting its capability to 
expand into new industries by shaping its resource profile, legitimacy, and competitive 
environment. Furthermore, the findings of contingent effects of firms’ internal resources 
(i.e. debt ratio and experience of market entry) on the relationship between portfolios of 
political ties and market entry integrate the internal and external resources derived by 
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firms into the theoretical framework of market entry, providing a more comprehensive 
theory about how the business scope of multi-business firms is determined.  
 Finally, the study sheds light on how the organization of government as a result of 
party competition affects the policy making processes and the efficacy of political ties 
portfolios. In particular, we argue and demonstrate that when the political power is 
predominantly controlled by the ruling party, and consequently there is strong alignment 
between the executive and legislative branches, a focused portfolio of ties with the ruling 
party is particularly effective for a firm to gain favorable policies and manage material 
reliance. This is ascribed to the ruling party’s ability to initiate, promote, and implement 
policies for its own interests without encountering any substantial resistance from 
opposition parties. In contrast, when the government is fragmented to the extent that the 
ruling party has executive authority and an opposition party possesses legislative 
authority, a diverse portfolio of political ties is more beneficial to market entry as it 
enables the connected firm to tap on diverse pools of resources while refraining from 
potential retaliation imposed by political parties. In so doing, we specifically respond to 
the call by Ring and his colleagues (2005) to study the interactions between executive 
and legislative branches under unified vs. divided governments and build a bridge 
between strategic management literature and the political science research.  
 Overall, we explore the market entry consequences, and contingent effects, of 
political ties between multi-business firms and political parties in the context of a 
pluralist political system. Our research integrates and contributes to the four literatures of 
corporate political strategy, networks, market entry, and organization of government. Our 
holistic approach enables us to better understand the hitherto unobserved connections 
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across them, and in turn allows us to develop insights into the broader question as to 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   






































      







































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2B Legislative Elections 
 
Year DPP KMT Others 
1998 70/225=31% 123/225=55% 32/225=14% 
2001 87/225=39% 114/225=51% 24/225=10% 
2004 89/225=40% 113/225=50% 23/225=10% 
 

















Presidential Election in 2000 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 4,977,737 39.3% Elected 
Nationalist Party (KMT) 2,925,513 23.1% Failed 
Presidential  Election in 2004 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 6,470,839 50.11% Elected 
Nationalist Party (KMT)  6,443,022 49.89% Failed 
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Table 5.3A Sample Composition of Taiwanese Business Groups (1998 and 2004) 
 







Number of Group 
Affiliates 
Average Number of 
Group Affiliates 
1998 167 103 62% 1820 11 
2004 227 103 45% 7773 34 




Table 5.3B Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables 
Entry 2.89 3.27 0 18 
Independent Variables     
Political tie with KMT 3.49 7.97 0 69 
Political tie with DPP 0.53 1.43 0 10 
Diversity of political tie 0.10 0.16 0 1 
Control Variables  
Total political tie 4.02 8.49 0 71 
Exit 1.41 1.55 0 10 
Group diversification 0.90 0.57 0 2.58 
Group size (logged assets) 10.25 1.53 6.40 14.84 
Group age 28.44 13.60 0 80 
Group ROA 3.87 8.27 -66.27 45.56 
Debt ratio 53.70 18.24 6.89 96.24 
Experience of market entry  5.54 4.84 0 44 
Industry profitability 6.21 3.73 -4.76 33.53 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter VI  
Conclusion 
Despite of the well recognized importance of the business-government 
relationships to firms in both developed and emerging economies, relatively less attention 
has been directed to the unique nature of the business-government interactions in 
emerging economies and its implications for firm strategy and performance. This 
dissertation contributes new insights to understanding this key issue by investigating 
when and how a firm’s linkages to the state influence its market entry activities. Based on 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis, we find that political ties between 
business executives and political actors are influential at various stages of the 
development of emerging economies. The function and effects of political ties are largely 
shaped by the nature of the relationship between connected parties, and the institutional 
environment in which the ties are embedded. In the context of a typical emerging 
economy, Taiwan, political ties are found to be influential throughout different stages of 
its development and their effects vary depending on the relationships between connected 
parties and the ever-changing political and economic environments. Our findings have 
implications for the business-government relationship in other emerging economies with 
similar political and economic systems to Taiwan. 
Furthermore, by adopting a holistic approach which examines both the bright and 
dark sides of political ties for market entries, our study cautions the blind use of political 
ties and provides abundant managerial implications for managers about how to build 
favorable political networks by connecting to the right persons at the right time. This 
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study provides insights for business leaders regarding how to make political investment 
wisely, given the internal resources of their firms.  
We see our study as advancing our understanding of the relationship between 
political ties and market entries in emerging economies, and we propose several 
extensions for future research. For example, future research investigating whether and 
how political ties may affect the mode of market entries (e.g. internal growth vs. 
acquisition) may be particularly useful to identify the underlying process through which 
political ties benefit or constrain the expansion of businesses. It might also shed more 
light on how political ties affect decisions on market entries, the sets of information and 
resources available to the focal firm, and the process of entry.  
In this study, we focus on the entry into new industries and control for the exits 
from incumbent industries because of the associations between the two types of activities. 
Future research considering the impact of political ties on both entries and exits may 
provide insights on how a firm’s political embeddedness shapes its business portfolio. It 
may also provide a more comprehensive political-based explanation to the evolution of 
business groups.  
Additionally, future research might examine the performance implications of 
market entries stimulated by political ties. By tracking the effect of political ties on a 
firm’s entry, and on its survival and development in the new industry, we are able to 
better understand how political ties influence the growth of firms in the short run as well 
as in the long run.  
Given the importance of business-government relationships and the growth of 
multi-business firms through diversification, we believe that additional studies linking 
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these two topics and enriching our understanding in any of these directions would 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA SOURCES AND CODING SCHEME OF FORMAL TIES, 
FAMILY TIES, AND SOCIAL TIES 
Data sources 
 To detect political ties between group leaders and political actors as accurate and 
comprehensive as possible, we referred to a wide set of publicly available data sources.  
Names of group leaders, including chairman of the board, CEO, and major shareholder of 
group affiliates, were collected from the directory of Business groups in Taiwan (BGT) 
compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. For listed group 
firms in the main board of Taiwan Stock Exchange, we collected names of CEO, major 
shareholders, as well as all the directors and auditors from the Taiwan Economic Journal 
(TEJ) database. To the extent that Taiwanese firms prefer to nominate family members, 
trusted persons, or associates to be directors and auditors (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005), we 
also regard directors and auditors as important conduits for firms to get connected to the 
external environment. In total, we collected 2,105 distinct names of business groups in 
1986, 2,222 in 1990, and 3,453 in 1994.  
With regard to political actors, we considered three types of political offices in 
Taiwan: (1) leaders of the dominant political party, KMT; (2) administrators in the 
central and provincial government; and (3) members of the national and provincial 
legislatures and judiciary. 
We collected names of leaders of KMT from its website (http://www.kmt.org.tw) 
and proceedings of party conventions.  Specifically, we coded the names of KMT central 
committee members and regular central committee members. Moreover, we collected 
name lists of national and provincial administrators (i.e. ministers and vice-ministers of 
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different ministries, directors and deputy-directors of departments one level lower than 
the ministries, and major officers in provincial government) from the website of the 
directory of the Taiwanese government (http://twinfo.ncl.edu.tw). In addition, we coded 
members of the national and provincial legislatures and judiciary from the website of the 
parliament (http://www.ly.gov.tw) and the website of the judicial institution, the Judicial 
Yuan (http://www.judicial.gov.tw). In total, we got 2,066 distinct names of political 
actors in 1986, 1, 137 in 1990, and 1,119 in 1994.  
Furthermore, we referred to additional three major sources to identify the social 
relationships between business group leaders and political actors. First, we checked the 
Excellent Business Database System (EBDS) (http://ebds.anyan.com.tw), which covers 
more than 200 periodicals and newspapers published in Taiwan and provides full-text 
search. We then searched through the Wealth Magazine (‘Tsai Hsun’) database, which 
provides periodical reports on the interaction between large business groups and political 
actors in Taiwan. The breath and depth of the reports in this magazine is comparable to 
those of Fortune and Far Eastern Economic Review. In addition, we surveyed 
autobiographies of group founders, dissertations, and books that devoted to this to topic 
(e.g. Chen, 1994; Hsu, 1991). 
 
Coding scheme 
We used different methods to code the three types of political ties. For the formal 
position interlocks, we cross-checked the name list of business group leaders with the 
name list of political actors. The number of overlaps between the two name lists indicates 
the number of formal political ties maintained by the business group.  
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With respect to family ties, we identified the familial and marital ties between 
business leaders and political actors. A business group has a family/intermarriage tie if 
one of its top managers or major shareholders has a tie of kinship or an intermarriage 
relationship with a political actor. For instance, Wang Yu-Chen, the top officer of Hwa 
Eng Wire & Cable Group, has an elder brother, Wang Yu-Yun, who used to be the mayor 
of Kaoshiung City and a member of KMT central committee. Hence, Hwa Eng Wire & 
Cable Group was coded as politically connected to KMT. Another example is Ho Tung 
Group, which got connected to the former chairman of KMT, Lien Chan, through the 
intermarriage between Lien Chan’s eldest daughter and the son of Ho Tung’s deputy 
chairman of the board, Chen Ching-Chung.   
To locate social political ties, we considered two major origins of such ties: (1) close 
friendships and same-hometown relationships, and (2) trade associations and social club 
memberships. Social ties emerge when the top managers or major shareholders of a 
business group are close friends of political actors or are from the same home town as 
political actors. An example is the long-established friendship between the chairman of 
Taiwan Cement Group, Koo Chen-Fu, and the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-Hui, built 
while playing golf. Tainan Spinning Group was also coded as politically connected 
because one of its top executives, Wu Hsiu-Chi, was from the same hometown as a 
famous political figure, Wu San-Lien, who used to be the Taipei City mayor and a KMT 
central committee member.  
Social ties can also be established when top managers or large shareholders of 
business groups have memberships in national trade associations and/or prestigious social 
clubs. For example, China Rebar Group was coded politically connected because its 
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President Wang You-Ceng was the chairman of the National Federation of Commerce, an 
important trade association through which the ruling party, KMT, propagated and 
executed its economic policies.  Another example is Chen Sheng-Tien, the top officer of 
Sampo group. He was a member of a prestigious golf club where business magnates and 
political leaders often gathered to play golf.  
When coding family ties and social ties, we first searched the names of the top 
executives and major shareholders of business groups in the databases and other archives. 
After reading through the descriptive information about interactions between group 
leaders and political figures, we coded family and social ties by ensuring that these ties 
potentially influence business groups through exchange of information and resources, and 

























APPENDIX 2: CAUSAL INFERENCE USING PROPENSITY SCORE 
APPROACH 
Using a recent econometric technique named propensity score approach (Dehejia 
and Wahba, 1999, 2001), we examine whether political ties maintained by a business 
group promote its entries into new industries. The estimation of political ties’ effect on 
market entry is an example of the general statistical problem of estimating treatment 
effect in observational studies.  
Drawing on the standard notation in causal inference theory, we denote the 
outcome or market entries of a politically connected business group as Yi1, and market 
entries of a non-connected business group as Yi0. We use Di to denote an indicator of 
political embeddedness which equals one for groups with political ties and zero for 
groups without political ties. E(Yi1| Di=1) denotes the average number of entries by 
politically connected groups, and E(Yi0| Di=0) the average number of entries by non-
connected groups. Hence, the effect of political ties on market entry can be indicated as 
τ|D=1 = E(Yi1| Di=1)- E(Yi0| Di=1) , which is the difference between the average entries of 
politically connected groups and the average entries these groups would have conducted 
if they had operated as non-connected groups. This difference is generally known as the 
average treatment effect on the treated and it is the parameter of interest to infer causality. 
As E(Yi0| Di=1) is unobservable, what can be computed instead is the difference between 
in average entries between connected and non-connected groups, which can be denoted 
as τ=E(Yi1| Di=1)- E(Yi0| Di=0). To make τ an unbiased estimator of τ|D=1, we need to 
ensure that E(Yi0| Di=1)= E(Yi0| Di=0), as it occurs under random assignment.  
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 The propensity score approach is a novel econometric technique that addresses 
this issue. Propensity score refers to the probability of assignment to treatment, 
conditional on observable variables. Assuming that assignment to treatment is associated 
only with observable pre-connection variables, propensity score method focuses on the 
comparability between treatment business groups (i.e. politically connected groups) and 
nonexperimental comparison business groups (i.e. non-connected groups comparable to 
connected ones in terms of pre-connection variables). The higher the comparability 
between treatment and comparison groups, the more accurate the estimated average 
treatment effect is.  
To implement propensity score approach, we first model a business group’s 
propensity to establish political ties as a function of the characteristics of the group, 
demographics of its top management team (TMT), and its industry. The group 
characteristics we use in our model include group size (measured as logged group assets), 
group age, group ROA, group debt ratio, group diversification, family ownership, and 
density of intra-group network. The demographics of group TMT we use are the averages 
of top managers’ age, education level (measured as an ordinal variable), and international 
experience (measured as a dummy variable which equals one if a top manager has studied 
or worked overseas, and equals zero otherwise). We also consider the industry 
characteristics of a group by using a dummy variable to indicate its core industry. To the 
extent that it takes time for firms to get politically connected, we take a two-year lag 
between group characteristics and its political connections. Table A reports the regression 
results of a probit model. Based on the probit model, we compute propensity scores, the 
predicted values from the model.  
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After separating the treatment and comparison groups and discarding all non-
connected groups with an estimated propensity score lower (higher) than the minimum 
(maximum) of the propensity score of politically connected groups, we stratify the 
remaining business groups into six blocks defined by the quantiles of the propensity score 
distribution for connected groups. The t-test of difference in mean of the propensity score 
between connected and non-connected groups within each block turns insignificant, 
suggesting that business groups in each block are comparable to each other in terms of 
pre-connection variables. We then calculate the difference in means of market entries 
between the connected and non-connected groups within each block. As shown in Table 
B, in three out of six blocks, the connected groups entered more industries than non-
connected groups, and these within-block differences are statistically significant based on 
t-tests. Finally, we estimate the average treatment effect as the average of the within-
block mean differences in market entries between connected and non-connected groups, 
weighted by the number of groups in blocks.  
The last row of Table B shows that when we use the econometric estimator by 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2001) to control for the selection bias, groups with political 
ties enter 1.30 more industries than groups without political ties, and this estimate is 
statistically significant. This finding shows that on average, political ties promote market 









Table A. Estimating the propensity of a business group to be politically embedded 
using a probit model 
 
Group Characteristics  Industry Category  




























Demographics of Group TMT  Electrical/Electronics 0.600 (0.731) 




Education level of TMT (t-2) 0.003 
(0.107) 
Real estate 1.206*** 
(0.402) 
International experience of TMT (t-2) 0.848*** 
(0.289) 






Log Likelihood -156.379 
Psedo R-square 33.56% 
Number of observations 491 
              Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.  
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APPENDIX 3: DATA SOURCES AND CODING SCHEME OF POLITICAL TIES 
Data sources 
 To detect political ties between group leaders and key figures of political parties as 
accurate and comprehensive as possible, we referred to a wide set of publicly available 
data sources.  Names of group leaders, including chairman of the board, CEO, and major 
shareholder of group affiliates, were collected from the directory of Business groups in 
Taiwan (BGT) compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. For 
listed group firms in the main board of Taiwan Stock Exchange, we collected names of 
CEO, major shareholders, as well as all the directors and auditors from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) database. To the extent that Taiwanese firms prefer to nominate 
family members, trusted persons, or associates to be directors and auditors (Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005), we also regard directors and auditors as important conduits for firms to 
get connected to the external environment. In total, we collected 2716 distinct names of 
business groups in 1998 and 3086 in 2004.  
With regard to party figures, we collected names of leaders of KMT and DPP from 
their websites (http://www.kmt.org.tw and http://www.dpp.org.tw) and proceedings of 
party conventions.  Specifically, we coded the names of KMT central committee 
members and regular central committee members. We also coded the names of DPP 
central standing committee members, central executive committee members, and central 
review committee members.  Moreover, we collected name lists of national and 
provincial administrators (i.e. ministers and vice-ministers of different ministries, 
directors and deputy-directors of departments one level lower than the ministries, and 
major officers in provincial government) from the website of the directory of the 
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Taiwanese government (http://twinfo.ncl.edu.tw). In addition, we coded members of the 
national and provincial legislatures and judiciary, together with their party affiliations, 
from the website of the parliament (http://www.ly.gov.tw) and the website of the judicial 
institution, the Judicial Yuan (http://www.judicial.gov.tw). In total, we got 3725 distinct 
names of politicians in 1998 and 3905 in 2004.  
Furthermore, we referred to additional three major sources to identify the social 
relationships between business group leaders and political actors. First, we checked the 
Excellent Business Database System (EBDS) (http://ebds.anyan.com.tw), which covers 
more than 200 periodicals and newspapers published in Taiwan and provides full-text 
search. We then searched through the Wealth Magazine (‘Tsai Hsun’) database, which 
provides periodical reports on the interaction between large business groups and political 
actors in Taiwan. The breath and depth of the reports in this magazine is comparable to 
those of Fortune and Far Eastern Economic Review. In addition, we surveyed 
autobiographies of group founders, dissertations, and books that devoted to this to topic 
(e.g. Chen, 1994; Hsu, 1991). 
 
Coding scheme 
Based on the ways through which business leaders and political actors get connected 
in Taiwan, we differentiate two types of political ties: formal position interlocks and 
informal ties. We used different methods to code the two types of political ties. For the 
formal position interlocks, we cross-checked the name list of business group leaders with 
the name list of political actors. The number of overlaps between the two name lists 
indicates the number of formal political ties maintained by the business group.  
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Informal political ties are family and social relationships between group executives 
and political figures. We coded three types of informal ties that were prevalent in Taiwan: 
1) familial and marital ties, 2) close friendships and same-hometown relationships, and 3) 
trade associations and social club memberships.  
A business group has a family/intermarriage tie if one of its top managers or major 
shareholders has a tie of kinship or an intermarriage relationship with a political actor. 
For instance, Wang Yu-Chen, the top officer of Hwa Eng Wire & Cable Group, has an 
elder brother, Wang Yu-Yun, who used to be the mayor of Kaoshiung City and a member 
of KMT central committee. Hence, Hwa Eng Wire & Cable Group was coded as 
politically connected to KMT. Another example is Ho Tung Group, which got connected 
to the former chairman of KMT, Lien Chan, through the intermarriage between Lien 
Chan’s eldest daughter and the son of Ho Tung’s deputy chairman of the board, Chen 
Ching-Chung.   
         The second type of informal political ties emerges when the top managers or major 
shareholders of a business group are close friends of political actors or are from the same 
home town as political actors. An example is the long-established friendship between the 
major shareholder of Lin Yuan Group, Tsai Hung-Tu, and the President of Taiwan, Chen 
Shui-Bian. They were classmates at the Taiwan National University and have been close 
friends since then. Evergreen Group is connected to DPP because the President of 
Evergreen Group, Chang Rong-Fa, is from the same hometown as You Hsi-Kun, the 
former President of DPP.  
 Informal political ties can also be established when top managers or large 
shareholders of business groups have memberships in national trade associations and/or 
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prestigious social clubs. For example, China Rebar Group was politically connected to 
KMT since its President Wang You-Ceng was the chairman of the National Federation of 
Commerce, an important trade association through which KMT propagated and executed 
its economic policies when it was in power.  Another example is Chen Sheng-Tien, the 
top officer of Sampo group. He was a member of a prestigious golf club where business 
magnates and political leaders often gathered to play golf.  
When coding informal political ties, we first searched the names of the top 
executives and major shareholders of business groups in the databases and other archives. 
After reading through the descriptive information about interactions between group 
leaders and political figures, we coded informal political ties by ensuring that these ties 
potentially influence business groups through exchange of information and resources, 
and/or sharing of common political ideologies with connected political actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
